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TOWARD A PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
Haochen Sun∗ 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
As a full-fledged legal tool in property and environmental law, the public trust doctrine 
has played an important role in deterring inappropriate exploitation of natural resources 
and improving protection of the environment. In this article, I explore the possibility of 
introducing the public trust doctrine into copyright law and explain why we need to 
expand the use of the public trust doctrine from natural resources to knowledge and 
information as informational resources. By and large, I demonstrate that compared with 
the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, the public trust doctrine, if introduced 
into copyright law, can create more effective and powerful institutional mandates to 
invalidate the socially unsound expansion of copyright protection, such as the recent 
extension of copyright terms.  
 
Moreover, I propose that we can tap into the public trust doctrine to generate a set of new 
legal techniques aimed at enriching copyright adjudication and policy-making discourse. 
To this end, I argue that we should use the doctrine to promote the ethical values of 
guardianship, responsibility, and community. Embedded in these values, the doctrine, as I 
will show, aims to promote and protect the public’s collective rights in knowledge and 
information held in public trust for all citizens. Moreover, the doctrine paves a new way 
to enforce both the government’s political responsibilities and the copyright holders’ 
social responsibilities regarding public access to and use of knowledge and information. 
Besides, I show how courts could apply the public trust doctrine to create alternative 
approaches to weigh the constitutionality of the recent twenty-year extension of copyright 
terms and to lay out a new decision for the Google Book Search Project case. 
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TOWARD A PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
Haochen Sun 
                                                                
                                                               
                                                               Each time you write something and you send it out into 
the world and it becomes public, obviously everybody 
is free to do with it what he pleases, and this is as it 
should be....  
                                                                                                                                 Hannah Arendt1  
 
                                                                   If his works deliver signs, they have to be deciphered 
without his assistance. If he participates in this 
deciphering, he speaks. Thus the product of labor is not 
inalienable possession, and it can be usurped by the 
Other.                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                         Emmanuel Levinas2 
INTRODUCTION 
We are facing an unprecedented environmental crisis. Deforestation has been 
quickly eating away trees; global warming has been vastly melting away polar ice; 
and water pollution has been ghastly depriving of human lives. At the forefront of 
our fight against the environmental crisis, the public trust doctrine has played an 
important role in deterring inappropriate exploitation of natural resources by 
government actors and private investors. By reclaiming the public’s collective 
interest in certain essential natural resources, it has reinvigorated the 
environmental movement 3  through championing the human values of 
“guardianship, responsibility, and community”4  in our public space or natural 
ecosystems.  
 
Meanwhile, we are facing an unprecedented environmental crisis in our cultural 
ecosystem. 5  Technological measures have been increasingly used to lock up 
                                                 
1  Remarks to the American Society of Christian Ethics, 1973 (cited in Margaret Canovan,  
Introduction, in HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION xx (2nd Ed. 1998)). 
2 EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY 176 (1969). 
3 See Erin Ryan, Public Trust & Distrust: Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine 
for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 479-80 (2001) (“Environmental activists 
widely hailed the emergence of the new public trust as the legal tool that would finally empower 
them against powerful private and government interests they believed imperiled natural resources 
nationwide”); David Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial 
Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 311 (1988). 
4 Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998). 
5 For explanations of the idea of the cultural ecosystem, see text accompanying infra notes 65-75. 
The use of the “environment metaphor” in this article draws on the idea of cultural 
environmentalism pioneered by James Boyle. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: 
Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L. J. 87 (1997);  Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, 
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2007); THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND 230-249(2008). 
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information; copyright terms have been retroactively extended to pull more works 
back into proprietary control; and databases have been given stronger legal 
protection in order to fence off public access. Heavily skewed by the copyright-
based conglomerates,6 the recent broad expansion of copyright protection, to a 
large extent, foreshadows the coming of a massive private enclosure of digital 
information.7 Amid this rampant enclosure movement, at stake is our cultural 
ecosystem which has been disrupted by the unprecedented expansion of copyright 
protection, bringing with it “unpredictable, ugly, dangerous, and possibly 
irreparable consequences.”8  
 
What can we do in order to deal with this crisis? In this article, I propose that we 
can tap into the public trust doctrine to generate a set of new legal techniques 
aimed at enriching copyright adjudication and policy-making discourse. To this 
end, I argue that we should use the doctrine to promote the ethical values of 
guardianship, responsibility, and community in the intangible public space, the 
sphere of essential importance to human development and communicative actions. 
Embedded in these values, the doctrine, as I will show, aims to promote and 
protect the public’s collective rights in knowledge and information held in public 
trust for all citizens (the informational resources in our cultural ecosystem). To 
this end, the doctrine paves a new way to enforce both the government’s political 
responsibilities and the copyright holders’ social responsibilities regarding public 
access to and use of informational resources in our cultural ecosystem. Hence, the 
public trust doctrine in copyright law functions to sustain and enhance the 
synergies between the major stakeholders in our cultural ecosystem, namely the 
members of the public, copyright holders, the government and courts, in order to 
promote a healthy public environment for individual and social development. In 
doing so, the doctrine enhances the substantive values of the public interest in free 
flow of knowledge and information on the one hand, and promotes the procedural 
values of democratizing the making of copyright policies and laws through 
engaging more public participation on the other hand.  
 
By and large, the public trust doctrine, as I will show, has the potential to address 
a major problem that looms large in the recent discourse on copyright and public 
domain. While it is unquestionably important to discuss the nature of the public 
                                                 
6 For discussion about this undemocratic problems in copyright legislative process, see the text 
accompanying  infra notes 154-161. 
7 See e.g. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 33 (2003); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: 
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); 
PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY? (2003); DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON 
WEALTH (2002); CHRISTOPHER MAY, AGLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: THE NEW ENCLOSURES? (2000). 
8 James Boyle, Environmentalism for the Net, supra note 5, at109.  
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domain,9 it actually becomes more important to think about how we can come up 
with effective legal techniques to sustain and enhance the public domain. Indeed, 
many commentators and public interest activists are very enthusiastic and hopeful 
about the invocation of the Copyright Clause10 or the First Amendment to counter 
and invalidate overly strong protection of copyright.11 Yet Eldred v. Ashcroft 12 
dealt as a direct blow to these approaches. The Supreme Court adamantly denied 
the claim that either the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment was a bar to 
the recent twenty-year expansion of copyright terms.13  
 
Against this backdrop, I will demonstrate that the public trust doctrine, if 
introduced into copyright law, can become an effective alternative tool to 
invalidate the socially unsound expansion of copyright protection, such as the 
recent extension of copyright terms. It further functions to revitalize the waning 
public interest-oriented tradition in copyright adjudication14 and policy-making.15 
From this perspective, the public trust doctrine does go beyond the reach of the 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. But it by no means follows that the 
                                                 
9 See e.g., Collected Papers on the Public Domain published in 2003 Law and Contemporary 
Problems (James Boyle ed.); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating 
the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN 
INFORMATION LAW 121 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); Pamela Samuelson, 
Enriching Discourse on Public Domain, 55 DUKE L. J. 783 (2006); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and 
Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2003); Jessica Litman, The Public 
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981).  
10 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 grants Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
11 See e.g., Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-
2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2239 (2000) (“The point remains the same: in an age of increasing 
‘statutorification’ in intellectual property law, the system needs a counterweight where the 
legislative process is skewed. The [Copyright] Clause of the constitution, long dormant, seems the 
best candidate.”); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008) (proposing that 
copyright law should be subject to the First Amendment scrutiny). 
12 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
13 For a comprehensive critique of Eldred’s major arguments, see Haochen Sun, Overcoming the 
Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 265, 320-22, 327-28 (2007). 
14 Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (“The primary 
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.’. To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original 
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a 
work.”) (citations omitted). Similar conclusions can be found in other cases. See Fox Film Corp. v. 
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 
F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994).  
15  See H.R. REP. NO. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909) (“The enactment of copyright 
legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that 
the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served 
and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods 
the exclusive rights to their writings…”). 
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doctrine would totally supplant them. Instead, the doctrine, as I will show, acts to 
buttress their embedded mandates by channeling a whole new set of concrete 
legal techniques into copyright adjudication and policy-making. Put differently, 
those legal techniques afforded by the public trust doctrine would effectively 
prompt courts to fulfill their judicial responsibilities to champion the cause of  the 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, and further to avoid rendering 
Eldred-type decisions. Moreover, the use of the public trust doctrine as proposed 
in this Article would create new ways to increase the public awareness of the 
importance of protecting free flow of knowledge and information, and to mobilize 
more members of the public to actively engage in policy discourse regarding how 
the ownership of knowledge and information should be allocated. 16  This is 
because the doctrine has the very potential to show the general public their stake 
in our cultural ecosystem as it did in the past to mobilize the environmental 
movement by increasing the public awareness of each human being’s stake in the 
environmental protection of our natural ecosystem.17  In this sense, the public 
trust doctrine would further buttress the mandates embedded in the First 
Amendment and the Copyright Clause by engaging more citizens to participate 
directly or indirectly in the making of copyright policies or laws.   
 
On the other hand, the bundle of the conventional doctrines embedded in 
copyright law per se is seen as the effective legal tools to prevent stronger 
copyright protection from stifling free flow of knowledge and information for 
social creativity and innovation. Put differently, it is submitted that copyright law 
itself contains adequate safeguard measures to protect and promote the public 
interest in free flow of knowledge and information. The fair use doctrine, for 
example, gives the public at large the privilege to use works without the relevant 
author’s permission and paying royalties.18 Therefore, the doctrine is hailed as a 
legal tool that defines “the contours of the private and public domains of human 
expression and in so doing, directly impact our capability for human flourishing.”19 
Yet the recent unprecedented expansion of copyright protection may have 
jeopardized the positive role played by the fair use doctrine in promoting free flow of 
knowledge and information. Congress has adopted a series of laws, such as the 
Millennium Digital Copyright Act, which may have unduly undercut the public’s 
conventional privileges of using knowledge and information under the fair use 
doctrine.20 Moreover, many courts have interpreted the fair use doctrine based on the 
individualistic vision of property rights and thereby turned a blind eye to the larger 
                                                 
16 For the discussion on the importance of engaging more public participation in shaping and 
reshaping intellectual property laws, see Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization 
and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008). 
17 See e.g., David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the 
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL 711, 732-33 (“The Public 
Trust Doctrine is a forerunner of the movement to guarantee certain environmental rights as 
fundamental human rights.”). 
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
19 Barton Beebe, Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes? Evidence From the 
Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 517, 522 (2008).   
20 See the text accompanying infra notes 76154-78, 93-95161. 
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public interest in free flow of knowledge and information.21 The combination of 
the legislative and judicial expansions of copyright protection, therefore, has 
made the fair use doctrine “an exceedingly feeble, inconsistent check on copyright 
holders’ proprietary control.”22 
 
Against this backdrop, the public trust doctrine will provide us with a vantage 
point to rethink the nature and scope of many conventional copyright doctrines 
designed to ensure the freedom of knowledge and information for both individual 
and social development. On the one hand, the doctrine, as I will argue, would lead 
us to broaden our vision of the public interest in knowledge and information by 
regarding fair use of works as the public’s collective rights. On the other hand, I 
will further argue that the public trust doctrine would lead us to rethink the social 
responsibilities that should be imposed upon copyright holders. From this 
perspective, the fair use doctrine imposes upon copyright holders a set of social 
responsibilities that require them to engage themselves in promoting the larger 
project of improving the cultural ecosystem of our public space. Through seeing 
fair use as the public’s collective rights and copyright holders’ social 
responsibilities, the use of the public trust doctrine in copyright law would offer a 
creative and dynamic interpretation of the nature and scope of the fair use 
doctrine, and further immensely help copyright law to deliver its promise to serve 
as the “engine of free expression.”23 
 
The initial Part of this Article reconsiders the social foundation of the public trust 
doctrine. It argues that the doctrine plays an important role in sustaining and 
improving the dynamics of our public space, which is essential to human 
development and flourishing. Drawing on the social foundation of the doctrine, 
Part II discusses how and why the doctrine should be introduced into copyright 
law. By combining the conclusions drawn in the preceding two Parts, Part III 
further delves into the legal foundation of the public trust doctrine. It explains in 
detail how the set of new legal techniques afforded by the doctrine are founded on 
the combination of the three agendas aimed at defending the public’s collective 
rights, enforcing the government’s political responsibilities, and requiring 
copyright holders to fulfill their social responsibilities respectively. The fourth 
Part seeks to apply the doctrine to overturn Eldred and to lay out a new decision 
for the Google Book Search Project case.    
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See the text accompanying infra notes 89-90, 127-143. See also, NETANEL, supra note 11, at 62-
66 (discussing the Blackstonian property-centered view of fair use that has been widely used by 
courts); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545 (2004) (explaining why wide use of the notion of 
transformative use in fair use cases can in turn cause serious free speech problems). 
22 NETANEL, supra note 11, at 63. 
23 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
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I. REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The public trust doctrine has a long and venerable history. Generally speaking, it 
stemmed from Roman law concepts of public property, which prescribed that the 
air, the rivers, the sea and the seashore were incapable of private ownership. 
Rather, they were dedicated to the use of the public. 24  With the rise and 
development of free trade in Europe, the idea of the public trust was invoked by 
those against king’s and feudal lords’ manipulative control of certain natural 
resources essential to the commercial manufacture and trade of products in the 
marketplace. Thereby, the Roman law idea of the public trust gradually took root 
in many common law and civil law jurisdictions in Europe.25  
 
American law adopted the modern version of the public trust doctrine after its 
debut in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 26  a decision rendered by the 
Supreme Court in 1892.  In Illinois Central, the Court invalidated Illinois state 
government’s privatization of the navigable waters of Lake Michigan and land 
underneath them. Because these resources were regarded as being “held in trust 
for the people of [Illinois],” the public “may enjoy the navigation of the waters, 
carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the 
obstruction or interference of private parties.27 Therefore, the Court ruled that the 
government could not grant any private parties a proprietary control over those 
resources, which would in turn exclude the public at large from having free and 
unimpeded access to and use of them.  
 
With the rise of modern environmental movement in the early 1960s, Joseph Sax 
revitalized the public trust doctrine by imbuing it with new substantive and 
procedural underpinnings. He argued that in terms of the substantive value, the 
public trust doctrine should not restrict itself to its conventional role in protecting 
the right of navigation, commerce and fishing. Rather, the doctrine could further 
act as a powerful legal tool for people to protect their right to sustainable 
protection of the environment. 28  With regard to the procedural value, he put 
                                                 
24 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. 2, tit. 1, pts. 1-6, at 65 (J. Thomas trans. 1975) (“By the law 
of nature these things are common to mankind – the air, running water, the sea, and consequently 
the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he 
respects habitations, monuments, and buildings which are not, like the sea, subject only to the law 
of nations.”). 
25 For example, in England, the public trust doctrine was recodified in the Magna Carta and forced 
upon King John in 1225 after his defeat at the battle of Runnymede. The treaty stipulated that 
neither he nor any future king could grant private hunting and fishing rights to favored earls and 
dukes, thereby cutting off the commons from people who relied upon them for their livelihood. 
By the eleventh century a French law had been decreed which said that “the public highways and 
byways, running water and springs, meadows and pastures, forests, heaths and rocks are not to be 
held by Lords; nor are they to be maintained in any other ways than that their people may always 
be able to use them.” See MARC BLOCH ET AL, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY 183 (1966). 
26 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
27 Id. at 452. 
28 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 478-89 (1970). 
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forward a proposal that the public trust doctrine empowers courts to act on 
citizens’ behalf to override unreasonable privatization of natural resources carried 
out by government.29 This is because the democratic process of governing use of 
natural resources is vulnerable to lobbying efforts made by the relevant interest 
groups. From this perspective, Sax proposed that in order to deliver its substantive 
and procedural promises, the modern public trust doctrine must be imbued with 
three interrelated standards of review: (1) “contain[ing] some concept of a legal 
right in the general public;” (2) “be[ing] enforceable against the government;” and 
(3) “be[ing] capable of an interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns 
for environmental quality.”30  With the surge of the environmental movement, 
Sax’s theory of the public trust doctrine has provided a legal cause of action for 
public interest activists and citizens at large to prevent or stop environmental 
harm caused to certain natural resources. Despite criticisms,31 the doctrine per se 
has been at the forefront of state common law developments aimed at protecting 
natural resources as public property. Meanwhile, the legal status of the doctrine 
has been formally recognized in many state constitutions and environmental 
laws.32  
 
Drawing on the lessons gleaned from a rich array of judicial opinions and 
scholarly discussions, I will explore in this Part the social foundation of the public 
trust doctrine, which would lay the ground for introducing the doctrine into 
copyright law. I will argue that we can re-conceptualize the role of the public trust 
doctrine beyond the conventional wisdoms by considering its social foundation 
from the perspective of the philosophical theory of the public space.  
A. Public Space as the Foundation of Human Development 
By and large, having a private space is of essential importance for every human 
being to achieve self-development and flourishing. The private space that belongs 
exclusively to a particular person draws up the boundaries of the sphere, such as 
walls, fences, doors and so on.  In this way, it affords the bounded sphere in 
which we are left free to choose the ways of satisfying our own desires and 
inclinations without undesirable interventions from others. Thus, in our own 
private spaces we remain free to design the contents of private life of being as 
individuals, including enjoying happiness and peace, and even living through 
loneliness or sorrow. From this perspective, the institution of private property is 
designed to protect personal freedom within the boundaries of the private space. 
                                                 
29 Id. at 491-565 
30 Id. at 474. 
31 See e.g. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986). 
32 For example, the Pennsylvania State Constitution provides that “public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these 
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefits of all the people.”  
PA. CONST. art I. §27. See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing 
Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006); Matthew Thor Kirsch, 
Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 Duke L.J. 1169 (1997). 
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Hegel, albeit seen as the inspirational figure for the modern communitarianism, 
insightfully observed that the premise of legal protection of private property in 
human society lies in the fact “[t]he person must give himself an external sphere 
of freedom in order to have being as Idea.”33 
 
Yet having the private space is not necessarily the only condition on which human 
beings achieve self-development and flourishing. The trajectory of the human 
development and flourishing, in fact, constantly entails the direct or indirect 
influence from others, be they known or unknown human beings. For example, 
our being able to speak a language as one of the basic human capabilities is 
acquired through numerous encounters and interactions with others. Although 
parents surely play an important role in nurturing our linguistic capabilities in the 
family setting, we sustain and enhance them through speaking with and listening 
to people we meet on various occasions. Furthermore, our exposure to the general 
cultural environment improves our linguistic capabilities, because it provides us 
with the multitude of key ingredients of communal norms which govern the ways 
in which people speak. They primarily include customs, traditions, and so on, and 
are by nature collectively shaped by the people who live in the same community. 
Therefore, the role of “others” in human development, be it direct or indirect, 
shows that human action and speech, as Hannah Arendt observed, are “never 
possible in isolation” and “need the surrounding presence of others”.34 
 
In addition to the “human” other, we also need non-human objects as the “other” 
for our development and flourishing. Things like houses, beds, clothes and so on, 
form the exclusive external spheres that are essential to our life in the private 
space. Meanwhile, there are non-human objects which constitute the 
indispensable “other” outside the boundaries of the private spaces. On the one 
hand, we can find our presence, be it constant or sporadic, in the non-human 
“other” which is not made by men. We go boating in the river, hiking in the 
mountain, and picnicking in the forest. In our eyes, these things, the non-man-
made “other”, form the natural environment to which we belong.35 On the other 
hand, we can find our presence in the “other” which is made collectively by our 
fellow human beings. We speak loudly in the town square, drive fast on the 
highway, and play happily in the park. These venues, the man-made “other”, form 
the social environment in which we are nurtured. Regardless of being man-made 
or not, all these thing-hood others create the environment that lies outside the 
boundaries of our private spaces.36  
                                                 
33 G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 41 (trans. H. B. Nisbet, 1991). 
34 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 188 (2nd Ed. 1998). Arendt also points out that 
“action and speech are surrounded by and in contact with the web of the acts and words of other 
men.”  
35 JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 3 (2007) (“The 
stillness of a remote forest lake or the imposing crags of a mountain peak provide for many both a 
sense of connection to a larger world and a sense of inner wonder.”). 
36 Mead uses the language process as an example to demonstrate that the self “arises in the process 
of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his 
10 
 
  
The otherness of human development,37 as discussed above, makes it impossible 
for any of us to live only within the closed boundaries of our won private spaces. 
Rather, because the “other” always physically exists outside of the private space, 
one’s coming to the “other” requires him to situate himself in the place where he 
and the “other” can meet each other, though the distance between them is not sure 
(sometimes face to face, sometimes not). Such arena is the public place where 
only open boundaries exit.  
 
The openness of the public place which accommodates “me” and “others” has two 
core attributes: publicity and commonality. On the one hand, the public space is 
the open arena where “everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by 
everybody and has the widest possible publicity.”38 On the other hand, the public 
space is the open arena where people have things together in common and these 
things ought not to be held in exclusive possession by any single person. 39   
Therefore, the public space affords people the sphere in which they can meet and 
act together to achieve social or political goals and to further set up norms that 
govern human interactions in the society as a whole.  
B. Public Space and the Public Trust Doctrine 
As shown at the outset of the preceding section, the thrust of the public trust 
doctrine is to keep certain natural resources held in trust for the general public as 
a whole. These resources are regarded as “inherent public property”40 and every 
                                                                                                                                     
relations to that process as a whole and to the other individuals.” GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, MIND, 
SELF, & SOCIETY 135 (1967). 
37 The phenomenologist account of human development offers the most profound discussion about 
the relationship between the self and the other. See e.g., G. W. F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
SPIRIT § 178 (A. V. Miller trans. 1977) (“Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by 
the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exits only in being acknowledged.”); EMMANUEL 
LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY 193(Alphonso Lingis trans. 1969) 
(“It is the face; its revelation is speech. The relation with the Other alone introduces a dimension 
of transcendence, and leads us to the a relation totally different from experience in the sensible 
sense of the term, relative and egoist.”). The idea of men as social beings further lends a strong 
support to the phenomenologist account of human development. See ARISTOTLE, THE 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 14 (Penguin, 2004) (“By self-sufficient we mean not what is sufficient for 
oneself alone living a solitary life, but something that includes parents, wife and children, friends 
and fellow-citizens in general; for man is by nature a social being.”); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 10 
(Oxford 1998); Karl Marx, Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in 66 THE MARX-ENGELS 
READER 85 (Robert V. Tucker ed. 1978) ( “[T]he human essence of nature first exists only for 
social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with man—as his existence for the 
other and the other’s existence for him—as the life-element of the human world.”); ROBERTO 
MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 216 (1976) (“[L]ike everything else the self is 
defined by the totality of its relations with other beings and, particularly, with other selves.”). 
38 ARENDT, supra note 34, at 50. A similar notion of the publicity is offered by Iris Young. See 
IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 168-170 (2000). 
39 ARENDT, supra note 34, at 52. 
40 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:  Commerce, Custom and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
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member of the public has free and unimpeded access and use of them. The public 
ownership vested in the general public makes the boundaries of the public trust 
resources constantly open to everyone on equal terms. Therefore, the public trust 
doctrine is by nature designed to maintain the public openness of the protected 
resources to every member of the public, and to prevent them from being 
privatized and equipped with closed boundaries by any potential private parties. 
As I will show below, there are, however, a variety of manipulative activities 
performed by either government or private parties, which result in the degrading 
of the openness of the public space. In this context, the public trust doctrine plays 
an important role in countering those manipulations and thereby protecting the 
openness of the public space that is of essential importance for human 
development and flourishing as shown in the preceding section.  
 
1. Against the Ecological Manipulation  
First and foremost, the public trust doctrine has been evoked as a powerful legal 
tool for combating the manipulative activities that cause the ecological 
deteriorating of the natural environment. It has been long recognized that the 
natural environment is formed by interconnected ecosystems as the networks of 
biota that mutually support one other. Each part of the natural environment is 
interdependent and can not be reduced into disparate bits and pieces. 41   The 
deterioration of the environment, by and large, results from human activities that 
make undesirable alterations to the integrity of the environment. They are 
routinely performed by people in order to exploit a particular part of natural 
resources without paying any sufficient heed to the negative impacts on the 
environment in its entirety.  
 
Against this backdrop, the public trust doctrine functions to protect and preserve 
the natural environment by providing safeguards against the “destabilizing 
changes”42 to natural resources as the public space for the general public. In doing 
so, it requires every member of the public to follow the “land ethic” that is based 
upon the notion that “[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise.”43  The doctrine, therefore, holds that “conservation of resources is 
intrinsically good and necessary for the continuation of society.” 44 By ruling out 
any unreasonable alterations to public trust natural resources, the doctrine 
recognizes and embraces the intrinsic values of maintaining the openness of the 
                                                 
41 See e.g., Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
875, 883 (1994) (“Our history … has taught us that activities in one part of the landscape greatly 
influence other parts.”). 
42 Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
L.REV. 185, 188 (1980) (“The central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing 
disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title. The 
function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such public expectations against 
destabilizing changes, just as we protect conventional private property from such changes.”). 
43 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 224-25 (1968). 
44 W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (1998). 
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natural environment. From this perspective, the California Supreme Court, for 
example, placed much emphasis on the practice of conservation through keeping 
the tidelands open for all: 
  
        There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public 
uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the 
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as 
ecological units for scientific study,  as open space, and as environments which 
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect 
the scenery and climate of the area.45 
 
Generally speaking, the manipulative activities that have been invalidated by the 
public trust doctrine fall into two categories. First, the doctrine has been invoked 
to flight unreasonable diversion of natural resources. For example, the California 
Supreme Court forbade the water department in Los Angeles to unreasonably 
divert water from the rivers feeding Mono Lake on the ground that the vast 
diverting of water had severely caused degrading of the lake’s scenic beauty and 
ecological values.46 Given that the lake waters are held in public trust for all the 
citizens in California, the state as the trustee of the water resources was deemed to 
have failed to “preven[t] any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate 
water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust.”47   
 
On the other hand, the doctrine has been invoked to regulate or prohibit activities 
that cause pollution to natural resources. For example, acting as the trustee of the 
natural resources concerned, the State of Idaho required a company to make a 
million-dollar restoration effort to remove oil sheen leaked in Idaho’s St. Joe 
River. 48 Moreover, courts have also used the doctrine to help the government or 
people to recover damages they sustained due to the pollution of public trust 
natural resources. 49   
 
2. Against the Economic Manipulation  
The rhetoric of the tragedy of the commons teaches that privatization is a panacea 
for overuse or depletion of natural resources for the public.50 Moreover, given the 
                                                 
45 Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60 (1971) (emphases added). 
46  National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 424-25  (Cal.,1983) (“As a result 
of these diversions, the level of the lake has dropped; the surface area has diminished by one-third; 
one of the two principal islands in the lake has become a peninsula, exposing the gull rookery 
there to coyotes and other predators and causing the gulls to abandon the former island.  The 
ultimate effect of continued diversions is a matter of intense dispute, but there seems little doubt 
that both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake are imperiled.”). 
47 Id. at 445. 
48  See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 1067 (2004). 
49 See e.g., In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (1980). 
50 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE (1968). Aristotle may be the 
first person to come up with this idea. For example, he pointed that “[they devote a very small 
fraction of time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own 
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heightened difficulty in reaching agreement due to the increased transaction costs 
when the number of parties increases, the theory of collective action further adds 
the rhetorical basis for making privatization as a means to the ends of optimal use 
of natural resources.51 The economic justification for privatizing natural resources, 
therefore, centers on the need to allocate exclusive control over resources to those 
who can make optimal use and management. It further highlights the role of free 
market in bringing about maximization of wealth for personal and social 
development.52 
 
Yet privatization through the invisible hand of mere privatization and free market 
begs the question why certain natural resources, such as the Mississippi River and 
the Central Park in the New York City, ought to be held in public trust and are not 
susceptible of private ownership. The rationale against expansive privatization of 
natural resources, by and large, stems from the fact the free market, albeit its 
liberty-promoting function, breeds coercions by creating monopolization of 
resources. In the modern society, it is inevitable for every person to get involved 
in the trade that takes places in the marketplace. While every person has the equal 
status as a trading participant in the marketplace, the type or amount of resources 
held in their control in fact differs from one another. Therefore, the bargaining 
power they have for negotiating deals in the marketplace always varies from 
person to person. Due to the unequal distribution of bargaining power, some 
people with stronger bargaining power can coerce others into following their 
commands, should the latter need anything from the former.53 Although the latter 
may turn around to seek another party to trade, the inequality of distribution of 
bargaining powers would still lead them to negotiate with those with stronger 
bargaining power, resulting in their being subjected to coercion again.  
 
From the bargaining-power perspective, an expansive privatization of natural 
resources would bring out the problem that the private owner may exert coercion 
on members of the public. On the one hand, by relying on the right to exclude, a 
private owner may prevent the public from exercising their public trust rights, 
such as walking across the private beach for fishing, bathing or swimming in the 
sea, and walking along privately-owned  lake shore to relax. 54   Under this 
circumstance, the private ownership of public trust resources is the shield against 
                                                                                                                                     
objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come to his neglect, that it is the business of 
somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by 
all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.” ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1261b (1885). 
51 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 125-28 (1971) (arguing that 
large-group organization is ineffective where the benefits are collective because of free riding). 
52  See eg., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32-34 (6th ed. 2003); Harold 
Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 347 (1967). 
53  See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 470 (1923).  
54 Town of Orange v Resnick, 94 Conn 573, 578; 109 A 864 (1920) (listing as public rights 
“fishing, boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish, gathering seaweed, cutting sedge and . . . 
passing and repassing”). 
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the public’s access to or use of the resources. It signals that unauthorized use of 
the resources concerned would result in legal penalties, should the owner asserts 
his rights before courts. For fear of the potential legal penalties, many members of 
the public may opt out of exercising their public trust rights.  Against this 
backdrop, the private owner simply coerces the public by using their bargain 
power to exclude. The public trust doctrine has been invoked by the court to stop 
the use of coercive power in this kind of case. For example, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court ruled that the public are legally to have unimpeded access to and 
make reasonable use of the privately-owned dry sand beaches to use the foreshore 
areas for recreational purposes like bathing and swimming.55  
 
On the other hand, if certain natural sources indispensable to the life of the public 
fall into proprietary control, property owners may charge access and use fees that 
most members of the public can not afford. Therefore, privatization of certain 
natural resources would lead to monopolistic control and abuses. Recognizing the 
grave harm that may be caused by monopolization of certain natural resources, 
courts repeatedly used the public trust doctrine to prevent navigable waters and 
the lands underneath them from being held under proprietary control. These 
resources inherently have the public trust status, because they are indispensable 
for commercial activities through navigation to take place. 56  The exclusive 
control over the navigable waters as the “highways of commerce,”57 would result 
in monopolistic price that is prohibitively high for regular navigation activities, 
causing an unreasonable increase in social cost of commerce. Therefore, the 
public trust doctrine aimed at keeping navigable waters open for all commercial 
activities, as the court concluded, “is founded upon the necessity of preserving to 
the public the use of navigable waters from private interruption and 
encroachment.”58 
 
3. Against the Cultural Manipulation  
Thirdly, the public trust doctrine invalidates the state action in allocating certain 
natural resources that would bring about cultural manipulation in the public space. 
Human interactions in the public space are of essential importance for human 
development. Keeping the public space equally open for all ensures that people 
are free to enter into the public space to interact and socialize with others. By 
providing the venue for human interactions, the public trust doctrine fosters a 
culture of participation through enriching human socialization and promoting 
democratic governance.  
 
                                                 
55 See e.g. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306 (1984). 
56 Rose, supra note 40, at 754.  
57 Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49(1894) (“[T]he 
navigable waters and the soils under them … shall be and remain public highways….”). 
58  Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 436 (1892). See also, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 
(invalidated exclusive privilege to navigate New York waters with steam vessels).  
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To enrich human socialization, the public trust doctrine mandates that certain 
natural resources should be maintained open for the public to use for the 
recreational purpose. These recreational uses permitted and protected by the 
doctrine include bathing, swimming, walking and so on. 59  A person’s 
participation in these recreational activities in the public space opens the door for 
him to mingle himself with others and to exchange his own thoughts and ideas 
with them. Moreover, it allows him to relax and improve his physical and mental 
well-beings by taking part in those recreational activities with the company of the 
known or unknown people in the public space. Being together with others in this 
setting may help him to walk out of the potential shadow of isolation and 
loneliness, and to have more fun in exercising and playing. By keeping certain 
natural resources open for recreational use by the public, the doctrine per se plays 
the role of encouraging people to enter into the public space, and thereby further 
promotes the culture of participation through facilitating active socialization 
among people in the public space. Any private activities that hinder active 
socialization in the public space, therefore, would amount to cultural manipulation. 
For example, if any private parties prevent members of the public from accessing 
the seashore areas to bathe and swim, they would be deemed to have caused 
public nuisance.60  
 
On the other hand, effective democratic governance necessarily entails citizens’ 
active participation in public discourse on a wide range of social issues. To this 
end, the citizens at large must have the freedom to take part in “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open”61 debate in the public space. From this perspective, the 
public space ought to be kept open for everyone to express their views, to make 
suggestions, to exchange information, and to raise doubts. The openness of the 
public space, in essence, allows people to perform speech activities in order to 
participate in democratic governance. For example, streets and parks are 
important venues for people make their speech activities effective in the public 
space. Any interventions that dilute the openness of streets and parks as public 
spaces, would result in suppressing free speech and thereby amount to cultural 
manipulation of the public’s initiative to participating in democratic governance. 
Hence courts have invoked the public trust doctrine to make sure that streets and 
parks as the public fora for free speech activities are open to all. For example, in 
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, the Supreme Court  famously stated 
that  “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used 
                                                 
59 For the role of public property in facilitating socialization, see Rose, supra note 40, at 777-781. 
60 Judge Best thought that “the interruption of free access to the sea is a public nuisance…. The 
principle of exclusive appropriation must not be carried beyond things capable of improvement by 
the industry of man. If it be extended so far as to touch the right of walking over these barren 
sands, it will take from the people what is essential to their welfare, whilst it will give to 
individuals only the hateful privilege of vexing their neighbours.” Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 
268, 275 (K.B.1821), cited in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95 N.J. 306 
(1984). 
61 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of 
citizens.”62  
 
 
II. RESHAPING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS AN LEGAL TOOL IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
In the preceding Part, I delved into the social foundation of the public trust 
doctrine by exploring how and why it plays an important role in deterring 
ecological, economic, and cultural manipulations so as to maintain the openness 
of a robust public space. The social foundation of the doctrine, as I will discuss in 
this Part, lays the bedrock justification for introducing the doctrine into copyright 
law. On the one hand, I will first show that the role of copyright law in governing 
the openness the (intangible) public space through allocating the ownership of 
knowledge and information would necessitate expanding the use of the public 
trust doctrine from natural resources to knowledge and information as 
informational resources. On the other hand, I will also show that the current 
modes of copyright protection have bred ecological, economic and cultural 
manipulations, and the public trust doctrine, if introduced into copyright law, 
would play a pivotal role in countering these manipulations and thereby further 
maintain and enhance the openness of the (intangible) public space.  By and large, 
I will seek to shed new light on why the public trust doctrine should be introduced 
into copyright law and will demonstrate that the court in Eldred v. Reno entirely 
erred in ruling that the public trust doctrine should not be extended to copyright 
law. 63  
                                                 
62  307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). See also, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (“No 
particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets are 
held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora.”). 
63 Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Insofar as the public trust doctrine 
applies to navigable waters and not copyrights, the retroactive extension of copyright protection 
does not violate the public trust doctrine.”). For discussion about the relationship the public trust 
doctrine and copyright law, see Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space:  A Public Trust 
Paradigm for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647 (2000); Margaret Chon, 
Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 
102-03 (1993). The core problem of these two articles is that they do not provide convincing 
reasons for the expansion of the doctrine. Nor do they propose any new legal techniques derived 
from the practice of the doctrine for courts to deal with hard copyright cases.  See also, Keith Aoki, 
Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order 
of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 37-42 
(1998) (proposing that the doctrine should be applied to knowledge and information but should 
not be introduced in copyright law). 
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A. (Intangible) Public Space and Copyright Law 
As shown in the preceding Part, there are certain natural resources that form the 
crucial elements of a dynamic and robust public space. Given that these natural 
resources exist in tangible form, they constitute the tangible public space where 
people engage themselves physically in the interactions with the other human 
beings and non-human objects. While the public space can be comprised of 
tangible resources, it can also be formed by resources that exist in intangible form. 
These resources are primarily knowledge and information and they constitute 
what I call the intangible public space.  
 
In the intangible public space, people use knowledge and information as the 
public resources to communicate with one another. Based upon the knowledge 
and information they obtain, people talk and write not only about their personal 
matters but also the larger economic, cultural, political issues. In this way, people 
exchange their understandings of these issues and try to figure out how they 
should deal with them. In addition to talking and writing, people also use 
knowledge and information in other forms of communicative actions,64 such as 
painting, dancing and so on. These actions performed by the movements of 
human body largely reveal people’s inner feelings to the outer world. The 
performers of these actions use knowledge and information to dictate and 
organize the movements of their human bodies to reveal their inner feelings to the 
audiences in the outer world. Given that the performing of all communicative 
actions is done in a public setting, it necessarily involves people’s public use of 
their reason.65 To use one’s reason publicly, one first selects the knowledge and 
information available in the intangible public space, and then uses it for the 
purpose of communicating with one another about their own inner world of 
reasoning.  
 
By and large, copyright law plays an important role in regulating the flow of 
knowledge and information in the public space. This is because it functions to 
regulate communicative actions and the ways in which people can legally make 
public use of their reason. By enacting copyright law, the state accords exclusive 
ownership on expressions of communicative actions, which include literature, art, 
film, artistic, audio/visual performances, television broadcasts and so on. 
Meanwhile, it further furnishes legal penalties against infringements of the 
exclusive rights over copyrighted expressions. Therefore, it is inevitable that any 
                                                 
64 For Habermas, communicative action plays an essential role in shaping human beings and 
human society in the following three ways.  “Under the functional aspect of mutual understanding, 
communication action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; under the aspect of 
coordinating action, it serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity; finally, under 
the aspect of socialization, communicative action serves the formation of personal identities.” 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (II) 137 (Thomas McCarthy tran. 
1984) 
65  For the idea of public use of reason, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS 
SOCIETY 27 (T. Burger trans. 1989). 
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knowledge and information in expressive form, may be subject to copyright 
protection.  
 
Given that private ownership inherently carries the power to exclude, copyright 
law inevitably acts as a filter that determines the extent to which knowledge and 
information would remain free of proprietary control in the intangible public 
space.66 The access to and use of knowledge and information, therefore, is no 
longer open and free for the general public in many cases. If one wants to use 
knowledge and information available in copyrighted expressions, he or she first 
needs to obtain permission from the relevant copyright owner. Therefore, it 
necessarily follows that only those who can obtain permission, for example 
through paying loyalties, are allowed to do that. By operating copyright protection, 
the state, therefore, inevitably makes a series of decisions regarding the 
availability of knowledge and information that remains open and free in the public 
space for people to use. From this perspective, copyright law by nature functions 
to determine the degree of the openness of the intangible public space. Akin to its 
role in acting as a check on the state’s power in allocating certain natural 
resources, the public trust doctrine could be applied by courts to examine whether 
the state has exercised its power of allocating informational resources in an 
appropriate and reasonable way. Generally speaking, the public trust doctrine in 
copyright law is embodied with the following two basic principles and how they 
could be used will be discussed in Part III.  
 
First of all, the public trust doctrine in copyright law mandates that knowledge 
and information ought to be held in trust for the general public as informational 
resources. Knowledge and information, as shown above, is an essential resource 
that empowers people to engage themselves in any communicative actions in the 
intangible public space. Accordingly, knowledge and information as 
informational resources, akin to certain natural resources such navigable waters, 
seashores and so on, are essential to keeping the public space open for all the 
people. For example, Jefferson emphatically stated that “Nature clearly wants 
ideas to be free! … Like air, ideas are incapable of being locked up and 
hoarded.”67 Similarly, Justice Brandeis’s famous opinion in International News 
Service v. Associated Press contains a classic defense of the public ownership 
nature of knowledge and information: “The general rule of law is, that the noblest 
of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—
                                                 
66 NETANEL, supra note 11, at 118 (“Copyright is speech regulation. … [C]opyright is heavily 
involved in allocating speech entitlements among various speakers and categories of speech.”); 
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1569 
(2005) (“Copyright regulates expressive activity. It controls the extent to which creators can build 
upon existing works in order to make commentary, collage, and other types of iterative creativity. 
Copyright also influences the availability and cost of expressive works that can be experienced by 
readers and other consumers of creativity.”). 
67 Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1291 (1984). 
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become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.” 
68 
 
On the other hand, the public trust doctrine requires that the government’s action 
in allocating the ownership of informational resources through the initiative of 
copyright law shall be made only for the protection and promotion of the public 
interest. By and large, the government is deemed the trustee of informational 
resources flowing in the intangible public space, and therefore is politically 
responsible for guaranteeing to “leav[e] no room for a statutory monopoly over 
information and ideas.”69 It is invalid for the government to grant copyright over 
informational resources purely for benefiting any private parties. In fact, the for-
the-public-interest requirement fully comports with James Madison’s opinion that 
copyright is an instance in which “public good fully coincides … with the claims 
of individuals.” 70  Moreover, it has been recognized by the courts which 
proclaimed that copyrights “are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the 
public good.”71  
  
B. The Public Trust Doctrine and Copyright Law 
In the discussion that follows, I will demonstrate that there are ecological, 
economic and cultural manipulations caused either by the government who has 
the political power to decide the level of copyright protection, or by the private 
parties who act as copyright holders having proprietary control over relevant 
information resources. The presence of these manipulative activities and the lack 
of the effective measures to counter them in the current structure of copyright 
protection further make it necessary to introduce the public trust doctrine in 
copyright law.  
 
1. The Ecological Manipulation  
Akin to the human existence in the natural ecosystem, there is a cultural 
ecosystem in which people perform communicative actions based upon public use 
of their reason. This is because our public use of reason entails a combination of 
two interconnected processes. On the one hand, we need to internalize knowledge 
                                                 
68 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also, Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, 
and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2003) (arguing that information should be seen as nonexclusive public 
property under Roman law doctrines).  
69 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 582 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
70 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST 241 (1826). 
71  Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 
U.S. 17, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited 
nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved.”). For more cases stating this opinion, see 
supra note 14. See also, Kenneth Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair Use 
Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 607 (2001) (“The framers of the U.S. Constitution clearly 
intended that the law of copyright…would be tailored to serve the advancement of knowledge.”).   
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and information into our inner minds to trigger the thinking and reasoning 
abilities. To be sure, once we enter into the public space, we lead us to the world 
of our observing and interacting with others in the public space as well. The 
process of observation and interaction generates the necessary knowledge and 
information for us to think and reason about matters in the intangible public space. 
On the other hand, we also need to externalize the knowledge and information 
resulting from our thinking and reasoning power to sustain and enhance our 
activities of observing and interacting with others in the public space. Every 
moment when we speak, write, or act with other body movements, we all impart 
to others the knowledge and information for them to perceive what we think and 
reason about. The process of writing, for example, clearly entails the combination 
of these two processes. Authors write based upon the knowledge and information 
acquired through their experiencing of the environment in which they live. In 
particular, they write by drawing on the materials written by others.72 Moreover, 
authors always spend time in writing for the purpose of communicating their 
thoughts from inner minds to the external world of people. From this perspective, 
writing is also a process of revealing and displaying authors’ inner minds to their 
audiences.73  
 
Therefore, the need for us to keep internalizing and externalizing knowledge and 
information makes our communicative actions and public use of reason 
inextricably intertwined with those of others’. In this sense, our intangible public 
space is by nature an ecosystem in which each of us performs communicative 
actions through the cultural exchange of the knowledge and information that 
flows in the intangible public space. We cannot divide our cultural ecosystem into 
separated bits and pieces. This would in turn result in blocking either our 
internalizing or externalizing of knowledge and information when we perform 
communicative actions. Akin to the natural ecosystem,74 keeping the integrity of 
our cultural ecosystem therefore has the intrinsic value for each member of the 
public. Thus, the ethos of conservation that goes against what Joseph Sax called 
“destabilizing changes” to natural resources applies to 75 to informational 
resources in our cultural ecosystem.  
 
                                                 
72 See e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1151, 1177-98 (2007). Widely recognized as the judge who decided the first fair use case, Justice 
Story straightforwardly commented that “in truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and 
can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. 
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much 
which was well known and used before.” Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (CCD Mass. 
1845). 
73 For example, Habermas portraits novelists’ writing activities as the process of “allow[ing] 
anyone to enter into the literary action” and this results in “the innermost core of the 
private…oriented to an audience (Publickum).” See HABERMAS, supra note 65, at 49-50. 
74 See text accompanying supra notes 41-45 . 
75See Sax, supra note 42. 
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It seems that the recent unprecedented expansion of copyright has made a 
significantly negative effect on free flow of knowledge and information by 
causing serious “destabilizing changes” to our cultural ecosystem. These 
developments in copyright protection, as shown below, significantly tighten up 
proprietary control over informational resources, making it hard for the public to 
use them in order to internalize knowledge and information to perform 
communicative actions.  
 
In 1998, Congress adopted the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) to give 
another twenty-year extension of copyright terms, prospectively and retroactively. 
However, the retroactive extension of copyright terms in particular, has pulled the 
works that are already or about to be out of copyright protection back into the 
proprietary control. 76  If the extension had not been made, these contents 
traditionally recognized as public property,77 would have remained free for the 
public to use. They can be seen as quasi ideas and facts not subject to any form of 
copyright protection. Moreover, the Millennium Digital Copyright Act (DMCA) 
prohibits circumvention of technological measures that are employed by 
copyright holders to lock up works in digital form, and further bars manufacture 
and distribution of devices capable of circumventing technological measures. 
DMCA accords paracopyright78 to right holders in that it would allow them to 
legally lock up any information with technological measures they deploy. Also, 
right holders are entitled to control access to their works, making it harder or even 
impossible for the public to make fair use of works under many circumstances. 
This is because the public can make fair use only when they have free and 
unimpeded access to works in the first hand, given that fair use presupposes that 
the public at large does not need to obtain permission from, and pay loyalties to, 
any copyright holders concerned. 
 
2. The Economic Manipulation  
Generally speaking, copyright law confers upon creators the market power to reap 
what they sow in the production and dissemination of their works. Therefore, at 
the heart of copyright law, lies its promise to protect economic rights as the most 
direct and important means of ensuring the monetary returns to creators.79 Yet 
                                                 
76 Under the retroactive extension, works copyrighted in 1923 and timely renewed will not enter 
the public domain until 2018, assuming no further extension.  
77 See e.g., Merriam v. Holloway Pub. Co., 43 F. 450, 451 (1890) (“When a man takes out a 
copyright, for any of his writings or works, he impliedly agrees that, at the expiration of that 
copyright, such writings or works shall go to the public and become public property ….”); 
Merriam v. Famous Shoe & Clothing Co., 47 F. 411, 413 (1891) (“[A]s the copyright on that 
edition has expired, it has now become public property. Any one may reprint that edition of the 
work . . .”).  
78 NETANEL, supra note 11, at 66-70; Dan L.Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
1095, 1096-1110 (2003). 
79  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] 
[C]lause ... is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best 
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”); American 
Geophysical Union v.Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 
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this model of protection, if not checked by the strong limitations on economic 
rights, may result in unbridled exploitation of those who seek for the license to 
use the works controlled by copyright holders.  
 
On the one hand, while the public has the privilege to make fair use of works with 
no need to obtain permission from pay loyalties to right holders, they may still 
end up paying right holders to get the unnecessary licenses. Under many 
circumstances, users are not sure whether their uses of works can be deemed fair 
by law, because the limitations on copyright such as the fair use doctrine are 
usually too vague and indeterminate for them to rely on to make such a 
decision.80 They then become afraid of being sued and a series of grave troubles 
they may get themselves plunged into, such as a large amount of time and energy 
needed to respond to the litigation and the potential damages and attorney fees 
they may need to cover. Faced with this kind of hidden coercion that may be 
exerted by the copyright holder, many individuals or entities may simply refrain 
from making fair uses of works,81 and many educational institutions in particular 
have already adopted overly restrictive fair use policies.82   
  
On the other hand, the public at large is also faced with the tangible coercion that 
may be exerted by the right holder against them. First, many copyright holders 
have routinely exaggerated the scope of their economic rights as a way to prevent 
the public from making fair use. For example, the cautionary notice—“No part of 
this book can be reproduced without the permission of the publisher”—can be 
easily found in almost every book published, be it copyrighted or not. Publishers 
also routinely require users in this way: you may quote no more than X number of 
words, lines, or paragraphs from the book.83 Yet it seems that all the publishers 
                                                                                                                                     
1994), quoted in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003). (“[C]opyright law celebrates 
the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will 
redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.... The profit motive is 
the engine that ensures the progress of science. ”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (“By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”). 
80 Sun, supra note 13, at 283-91; James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887-95 (2007).  
81Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545 (2004) (“Even a successful fair use defense is expensive, 
and the risk of such a lawsuit deters publishers from investing in potentially infringing works...”). 
82 William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1694 
(1988) (“[A]s almost any college teacher can attest, the information presently being given faculty 
by university counsel regarding how much copyrighted material they may reproduce for classroom 
use is distinctly unhelpful.”); William W. Fisher & William McGeveran, The Digital Learning 
Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Materials in the Digital Age 85-87 
(2006) (listing the “[u]nduly [c]autious [g]atekeepers” of fair use in university settings); Robert A. 
Gorman, Copyright Conflicts on the University Campus, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 297, 313 
n.36 (2000) (describing NYU’s adoption of restrictive fair use guidelines after a lawsuit over 
copying course materials). 
83 See STEPHEN FISHMAN, THE COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK: HOW TO PROTECT & USE WRITTEN WORKS 
11/8 (8th ed. 2005) (“[A]lthough there is no legally established word limit for fair use, many 
23 
 
accustomed to using exaggerations of that kind have totally turned a blind eye to 
the fair use doctrine that sets up no special limit on the amount users can copy and 
in fact allows the public to reproduce portions of or even the entire copy of the 
work. 84  Moreover, copyright holders may leverage their economic rights to 
impose prohibitively high licensing fees for users. Such practice is still legal 
because they charge fee simply in accordance with the business practices they 
uses.  
 
The following story epitomizes both the hidden and tangible coercions that 
copyright holders especially those big media corporations can exert on the pubic.  
Jon Else, a documentary filmmaker, spent almost nine years in raising funds and 
producing a non-commercial documentary. Yet Fox News insisted on charging a 
licensing fee of $10,000 for him to use “a 4.5-second, out-of-focus, no-sound 
background shot” in that documentary. Else was advised that his use of that shot 
might be fair use, but he might plunge himself into the trouble of litigation if Fox 
News decides to sue him. Because the licensing fee was prohibitively high for 
him, he had to cut that shot off from his documentary.85 Jon Else’s story is not an 
isolated case. Rather, many other documentary filmmakers and researchers and 
students in educational institutions alike are faced with the same situation.86   
 
3. The Cultural Manipulation  
By furnishing the protection of economic rights, modern copyright law functions 
to relieve creators from their financial reliance on the individual or state patronage 
which may unduly influence the ways in which they express their own ideas and 
opinions. With the securing of their economic independence, creators are 
supposed to produce and disseminate works reflective of their own thoughts, 
making contribution to the cultural diversity of our society. Yet it is inevitable 
that protecting economic rights as the core of copyright law inculcates people 
with the notion that literal and artistic creation always involves monetary returns, 
and the more works one creates or controls, the more economic benefits one can 
reap. From this perspective, copyright law condones or even encourages that 
mentality of maximizing economic benefits in producing and disseminating works 
of authorship. Against this backdrop, for many corporate entities in particular, 
maximizing economic benefits becomes the sole motivation of engaging in or 
organizing literary and artistic creations.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
publishers act as if there were one and require their authors to obtain permission to quote more 
[than] a specified number of words (ranging from 100 to 1,000 words.”). 
84 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that verbatim 
copying for time-shifting purpose is fair use );  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
(1994) (holding that extensive copying for the purpose of  making parody is fair use). 
85 See NETANEL, supra note 11, at 15-17. 
86 See e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS  (2005); Fisher & McGeveran, 
supra note 82.  
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Yet the ethics of maximizing economic benefits promoted by the current modes of 
copyright protection may have caused serious problem of cultural manipulations. 
In many circumstances, copying works is crucial for members of the general 
public to participate in the cultural life in a society.87 Activities of this kind are 
generally seen as conducive to cultural development and social well-being. For 
example, researchers and educators routinely need to copy reasonable portions of 
works in order to do research and carry out teaching activities. Music sampling 
greatly helps musicians to compose new music. Yet copyright holders especially 
those big companies wield strong power to stop members of the public from 
copying their works and thereby hamper their cultural participation. As long as 
copyright holders deem it necessary to act for the purpose of maximizing their 
economic benefits, they would simply send relevant members of the public cease-
and-desist letters or sue them without regard to whether copying may be 
beneficial to the society at large. Faced with the threat of that kind, many 
members of the public would simply stop copying works and further give up their 
activities in cultural participation. Even if they opt not to stop, they may be 
ordered by courts to pay the potential damages, the amount of which is usually 
prohibitively high.  
 
In fact, courts have actually rendered a large number of cases that have the effect 
of condoning or even promoting those legal actions that filed by copyright holders 
purely out of their maximization-of-economic-benefits impulses. For instance, it 
has become trendy for courts to see transformative use of a work as presumptively 
fair use.88 Yet many courts have taken it for granted that nontransformative use of 
a work may amount to an infringement of copyright. Against this backdrop, courts 
repeatedly ruled that nontransformative use, including plain old photocopying 
even in scientific or educational settings, is presumptively not fair use. 89  
                                                 
87 See e.g., Tushnet, supra note 81, at 562-81; Olumfunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip 
Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006); 
ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, 
APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW 248-99 (1998). 
88 For transformative use, courts asks “whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of 
the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message…” See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
The  Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music further explained that though a “transformative use is 
not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, . . . the more transformative the new work, the 
less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding 
of fair use.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. See also, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 
1257, 1271-74 (11th Cir. 2001); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 806, 801-
02 (9th Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003). 
89 See e.g., L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 at 75 (C.D. Cal. 2000) 
(“Conversely, the amount and substantiality of the copying and the lack of any significant 
transformation of the articles weigh heavily in favor of plaintiffs….”); Weissmann v. Freeman, 
868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a use merely for the same  as the original work 
“moves the balance of the calibration on the first factor against” user of the work and “seriously 
weakens a claimed fair use”); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994)  
(“Rather than making some contribution of new intellectual value and thereby fostering the 
advancement of the arts and sciences, an untransformed copy is likely to be used simply for the 
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Moreover, courts even ruled that any sampling from a sound recording, 
presumably even a single note, infringes the copyright in the sampled recording.90  
 
4. Internal and External Safeguards 
As shown above, there are ecological, economic and cultural manipulations 
lurking in the current mode of copyright protection.  Given the limit of space, I 
pointed out only some of the major manipulative activities. Yet copyright law, as 
I will demonstrate in the discussion that follows, contains neither the necessary 
internal nor external safeguards that are strong enough to effectively deter those 
manipulations. This further makes it necessary and urgent to introduce the public 
trust doctrine into copyright adjudication and policy-making.  
 
a. Internal Safeguards 
Copyright law itself contains the internal safeguards aimed at preventing absolute 
protection of private ownership. By and large, they carve out the limitations on 
exclusive rights vested in creators. For example, the idea/expression dichotomy 
dictates that it is the expression of ideas rather than ideas that is the subject matter 
of copyright protection.91 Moreover, copyright law is supposed to provide legal 
protection in limited duration. Besides, the fair use doctrine allows the public in 
general to use reasonable portions of works for purposes such as “criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.” 92  While these 
internal safeguards do provide the necessary breathing room for the public to use 
the knowledge and information contained in copyrighted works, they are in fact 
not strong enough to curb the potential ecological, economic, and cultural 
manipulations.  
 
First, these internal safeguards do not set up any institutional limits on the 
government’s power to privatize knowledge and information in the public space. 
By and large, they act as the tool kit for the court to adjudicate the copyright 
                                                                                                                                     
same intrinsic purpose as the original, thereby providing limited justification for a finding of fair 
use.”); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, 166 F.3d 65, 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(finding that absence of transformative use in a case involving translation of news items weighed 
heavily against fair use); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 
(6th Cir. 1996). Moreover, courts repeatedly held that nontransformative uses should be presumed 
to cause market harm. This makes it unlikely for them to rule that nontransformative uses are not 
infringing. See, e.g. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(“Because, on the facts presented, [defendant’s] use of The Cat in the Hat original was 
nontransformative, and admittedly commercial, we conclude that market substitution is at least 
more certain, and market harm may be more readily inferred.”); Oasis Publ’g Co. v. West Publ’g 
Co., 924 F. Supp. 918, 929 (1996) (presuming the existence of because of nontransformative use); 
Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. 
L.REV. 677, 716-17 (1995).  
90 See e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
91 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea.”); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 
(1954). 
92 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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disputes between private parties and to decide whether allegations against 
infringements of copyrights should be upheld. On the other hand, these safeguards 
are basically incorporated into copyright law by the legislature and used as the 
tool kit to prevent protection of copyrights from being absolute. The legislative 
body is by nature the drafter or codifier of these safeguards. Inevitably, absent in 
these safeguards is the external institutional check on the legislative power to 
examine the validity of the government’s decisions regarding the allocation of 
informational resources. As shown in the discussion that follows, both the CTEA 
and the DMCA were in fact adopted by the government without taking into 
account their potential in seriously jeopardizing the role of these internal 
safeguards in promoting free flow of information and knowledge.  
 
Secondly, the recent unprecedented expansion of copyright protection, in fact, 
was accompanied by the agendas aimed at significantly weakening the power of 
those internal safeguards as the limitations on copyrights. For example, the CTEA 
simply relaxed the mandate that the terms of copyright protection shall be strictly 
limited. It opened the door for the potential extensions of copyright term as long 
as the legislature sees fit. 93  Moreover, the DMCA’s rigid anti-circumvention 
protection effectively renders the idea/expression dichotomy meaningless in the 
digital age.94 The DMCA confers up copyright holders a de facto right to restrict 
access to their works, making it much harder for the public make fair use of works 
in a meaningful way. Fair use presupposes that the public at large first have free 
access to works and then make decisions regarding whether they need to make 
fair uses.95  Yet free access to works is no longer available for users because 
technological measures deployed by copyright holders simply fence off them 
from getting access to works and the DMCA furnishes penalties against 
circumvention of those “digital fences”. Hence, the waning of the internal 
safeguards furnishes larger room for copyright holders to maneuver so as to have 
their manipulative activities organized to their advantage. It also further 
demonstrates that these internal safeguards themselves lack the necessary 
institutional check on the governmental power, which leaves the door widely open 
for the government to bypass the principles embedded in those safeguards as they 
see fit. 
 
Thirdly, the internal safeguards’ inability to curb the manipulative activities 
committed by copyright holders is further exacerbated by their inherent 
indeterminacies. 96  For example, copyright law simply states that the 
idea/expression dichotomy is a baseline principle for copyright protection. Yet it 
                                                 
93 See text accompanying supra notes 76-77.  
94 See text accompanying supra note 78. 
95 Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 
137, 140 (1999) (observing that “it may be fair use to make nonprofit research photocopies of 
pages from a lawfully acquired book; it is not fair use to steal the book in order to make the 
photocopies.”). 
96 For a comprehensive discussion about the indeterminacy problems inherent in copyright law, 
see Sun, supra note 13, at 303-311; Gibson, supra note 80 at 887-906. 
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never ascertains and in fact it is exceedingly difficult to make sure what could be 
seen as non-copyrightable “ideas” or otherwise as copyrightable “expressions”.97 
Accordingly, Judge Hand once lamented that “[n]obody has ever been able to fix 
[the] boundary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can.”98 Moreover, 
the fair use doctrine, too, is actually fraught with a host of uncertainties. The 
legislative history shows that Congress did not intend to shape the doctrine as 
“bright-line rules”99 for courts. Worse still, in the real world of practice, the courts 
have developed inconsistent, and even conflicting, approaches to apply the 
doctrine. 100  For example, with respect to whether the use of works is for 
commercial purpose or not, the Supreme Court in Sony101 and Harper & Row102 
held that any commercial use of works ought to be regarded as “presumptively 
unfair.” Yet it ruled in Campbell to the contrary that commercial or 
noncommercial character of a work “is not conclusive,” and this factor shall be 
“weighed along with others in fair use decisions.”103 Against this backdrop, the 
multitude of indeterminacy problems inherent in those internal safeguards 
definitely leaves a sizable gap within which the government or copyright holders 
may maneuver to perform those manipulative activities. For example, as shown 
above, media corporations and publishers routinely set up unreasonable 
requirements for the public to obey, such as the specific number of words and 
lines they can quote.104 Worse still, the relevant members of the public are not 
able to “fire back”, because they and even their lawyers are not sure whether their 
use of works could be deemed fair by the court. Against this backdrop, the risk-
averse public would choose not to challenge copyright holders before courts.   
 
 
                                                 
97 Sun, supra note 13, at 307 (“Yet charting the boundaries between idea and expression is no 
easy work in many cases. On the one hand, while the idea/expression dichotomy is hailed as a 
universal standard for setting the threshold of copyright protection, no efforts as to what elements 
of works would fall into the two baskets of “idea” and “expression” respectively, have ever been 
done in any national and international copyright law.”). 
98 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
99 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 n.31 (1984) (noting that Congress had “eschewed a rigid, bright-line 
approach to fair use”); Sony’s opinion in this respect has been consistently endorsed by the 
Supreme Court’s decisions pertaining to fair use. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588; 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (pointing out that “[t]he task [of section 107] is not to be simplified 
with bright-line rules . . . .”). See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A] (13-159) (arguing that nothing in section 107 provides “a rule that may 
automatically be applied in deciding whether any particular use is ‘fair’”). 
100 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2 Cir. 1939) (“the issue of fair use, which alone 
is decided, is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright”). 
101 Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (“[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an 
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright . . . .”). 
102 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 540 (“The fact that the publication was commercial as opposed to 
nonprofit is a separate factor tending to weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
103 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (contended that “hard evidentiary presumption”147 of this type 
“would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107 . . . .”  
See also Sony, 464 U.S. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (drawing the same conclusion). 
104 See supra note 83. 
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b. External Safeguards 
It is widely recognized that the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment set up a 
check on the governmental power in granting proprietary control over 
informational resources and thereby they together act as the external safeguards 
against manipulative activities. Yet both of them can only target the state action 
regarding allocation of informational resources. According to the state action 
doctrine, they cannot directly constrain that private action that may cause a host of 
manipulative problems as shown in the preceding section. 105   While the 
government may abuse its power, copyright holders, as demonstrated in the 
preceding section, still commit a series of manipulative activities which cannot be 
effectively and adequately deterred by the internal safeguards embedded in 
copyright law. Therefore, the external safeguard would simply turn a blind eye to 
the manipulative activities committed by copyright holders as private actors.  
 
Even though the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment can play its role as the 
check on government power, they actually do not play a sufficiently strong role in 
examining whether or not the government exercises its power in a manner 
conducive to the promotion and protection of public interest. For the Copyright 
Clause, it seems that it carries no active institutional check on the state action in 
allocating informational resources. For instance, the Supreme Court has stated 
that the Copyright Clause does not empower the judiciary to scrutinize whether 
any state action in expanding copyright is valid under the Clause. “[The Court] is 
not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments 
of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”106 Without 
competent institutional check on the state power to allocate informational 
resources, the Copyright Clause has instead become the ground on which the 
legislature can enact law to strengthen copyright protection, which in effect 
chiefly caters to the private interest of copyright holders and thereby brings about 
marginal or no benefits for the public interest in learning and knowledge 
sharing.107  
                                                 
105 See e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (“Careful adherence to the 
‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal 
law and federal judicial power.”); Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of 
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1387(2006) ( “[T]he Constitution does not purport 
to determine how one person is to treat another. So far as the Constitution is concerned, one 
individual may steal the possessions of another, assault another person, even commit murder, and 
it is not a violation of the Constitution.”). 
106 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208. The majority also concluded that “it is generally for Congress, not the 
courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives.” Id. at 212. See also, Sony, 
464 U.S., at 429 (“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of [rights] 
that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to 
their work product.”). 
107 See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a 
Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006) (“[E]ven if an 
Eldred II were filed tomorrow, we would still be unlikely to see the Supreme Court writing a 
manifesto about the nature of the [Copyright] Clause as a limitation [on government’s power in 
allocation of information resources].”). 
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Regarding the First Amendment, both free speech right and property right are 
largely regarded as fundamental rights enjoyed by citizens. 108  This renders it 
impossible for the free speech right to gain the necessary primacy over property 
rights which surely include copyright. 109 Therefore, it follows that in allocating 
information resources through enacting copyright law, the government may not 
presumptively give primacy to free speech values over the need to protect 
copyright. Moreover, courts have ruled that copyright can actually trump free 
speech right in certain cases. For example, in treating copyrighted works as the 
embodiment of creators’ speeches, Eldred held that the free speech principle 
“bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s 
speeches.”110 On the other hand, there has been a widely-accepted assumption 
that the internal safeguards such as the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
doctrine, function as the safety valves that make copyright law presumptively 
compatible with the free speech values. From this perspective, it follows that 
copyright law can generally pass the First Amendment muster.  
 
III.  REIMAGINING THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
In the preceding two Parts, I discussed the social justification for introducing the 
public trust doctrine into copyright law. I argued that akin to the justification that 
makes the doctrine fully-fledged in both environmental and property laws, we can 
draw on the doctrine to promote and protect our intangible public space against 
the backdrop that the recent copyright laws enacted by the state have produced an 
enormous negative impact on the vibrancy of our cultural ecosystem. In particular, 
I considered the potential role of the public trust doctrine in filling up the gap left 
by the internal and external safeguards to counter the ecological, economic, and 
cultural manipulations lurking in our cultural ecosystem.  
 
                                                 
108 Carol M. Rose, Property As the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 (1996); Cass R. 
Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, CARDOZO L. REV. (1992). But see Laura S. 
Underkuffler, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033 (1996). 
109 The conflicting judicial opinions regarding shopping mall cases clearly demonstrate this point.  
In some cases, courts ruled against private owners of shopping malls and ordered opening of malls 
for free speech activities. See e.g. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); N.J. 
Coalition Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326, 333 (N.J. 1994). Yet, 
courts also have ruled to the contrary on the basis that “property [does] lose its private character 
[even though] the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.” Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 571 (1972). See also, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705  (1977); Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. 
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23 (Pa. 1986); Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Ore. 
38 (Or. 2000).   
110 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (“The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-or 
decline to make-one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make 
other people’s speeches.”). 
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The conventional wisdom about copyright law, as demonstrated in the preceding 
Part, harbors the complacency that either the internal or external safeguards can 
effectively ward off a variety of manipulative activities in the area of copyright 
protection.  I pointed out that there is in effect no room for the complacency of 
that kind. In the Part that follows, I will consider the legal foundation of the 
public trust doctrine in copyright law and how courts can use the doctrine as a 
legal tool to invite a set of new legal techniques so as to counter the manipulative 
activities committed by the state or private actors to our cultural ecosystem. 
Moreover, the set of legal techniques embodied in the doctrine, as I will explain, 
is composed of three concrete elements: (1) defending the public’s collective 
rights in public trust informational resources; (2) effectuating the government’s 
political responsibilities through courts’ exercise of the judicial review power; 
and (3) enforcing the copyright holder’s social responsibilities through the courts’ 
broadly looking at the need of public interests.  As I will show, these legal 
techniques can largely be borrowed from the judicial practices of the public trust 
doctrine in protecting certain essential natural resources that form our public 
space.  
A. Defending the Public’s Collective Rights  
1. Collective Rights in Public Trust Natural Resources   
When invoking the public trust doctrine, courts repeatedly emphasize that the 
doctrine by nature aims to protect the public’s rights to get access to or use of the 
public trust resources, and every member of the public shall enjoy such rights on 
equal terms. In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court emphatically made the rights-
based statement as follows: 
 
           [The title to submerged lands] is a title different in character from that which 
the State holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which 
the United States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption and 
sale.  It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy 
the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty 
of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private 
parties.111 
 
Based upon the conventional rights of navigation, commerce and fishing 
enunciated in Illinois Central, many state courts have expanded the scope of 
public rights to cover recreational uses. For example, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court first expressly recognized that the public trust rights protect a variety of 
recreational activities including “boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish, 
gathering seaweed, cutting sedge, and … passing and repassing” in the public 
trust resources.112  Generally speaking, there has been a solid recognition of the 
right of recreational use in many states, such as California,113 New Jersey,114 
                                                 
111 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452. 
112 Town of Orange v Resnick, 94 Conn 573, 578 (1920). 
113 Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251(1971); National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 
419 (1983). 
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Washington,115 Michigan,116 etc.117Meanwhile, given the paramount importance 
of ecosystem preservation, the public trust doctrine has been widely used to 
protect the public right to environmental protection.118  
 
The rights protected by the public trust doctrine are by nature collectively held by 
persons as members of the public. In this sense, they are not individual rights, but 
rather collective rights. This is primarily because people acquire and enjoy the 
bundle of public trust rights based upon their social membership in the public 
space. Under the public trust doctrine, it is recognized that every member of the 
pubic shares a stake in the public trust resources which form the tangible public 
space. Therefore, the realization of the collective rights is indispensable for 
cultivating human beings as social members and enhancing their interests in the 
communal development. 119   By contrast, individual rights that protect private 
property, personal privacy and so on, are bestowed upon persons primarily for the 
purpose of promoting individual worth and dignity as human beings. 120  The 
realization of individual rights is deemed to have intrinsic values to self-
actualization and self-development.  
 
Judging from the multitude of public trust doctrine cases, the collective rights 
protected by the doctrine have two salient attributes. First, they are not divisible in 
terms of how individuals can share the protected resources. Every member of the 
public, from the letters and spirits of law, is equally entitled to have access to, and 
make use of, the public trust resources which ranges from navigable waters, 
                                                                                                                                     
114 Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 323 (1984); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. 
Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 185 N.J. 40 (2005). 
115 Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621 (1987). 
116 Glass v. Goeckel, 473 Mich. 667 (2005).  
117 Yet the Massachusetts and Maine Supreme Court refused to extend the public trust doctrine to 
recreational uses and strictly limited it to navigational and fishing purposes. See Bell v. Town of  
Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (1986); Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681 (1974). 
118 California is generally seen as the first state to recognize the public’s right to environmental 
protection under the public trust doctrine. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251(1971); National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419 (1983). All most all commentators maintain 
that the public has the right to environmental protection under the public trust doctrine. See e.g., 
Sax, supra note 42; Klass, supra note 32; Bernard S. Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust 
Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388 (supporting that the right to healthy 
environment stems from the interaction of the public trust doctrine with the Ninth Amendment); 
David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of 
Private Property,  supra note 17. 
119 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 208 (1986) (arguing that collective rights protect 
“interests of individuals as members of a group in a public good and the [collective] right is a right 
to that public good because it serves their interest as members of the group”).  See also, Lesie 
Green, Two Views of Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 315 (1991) (explaining 
why collective rights should be viewed as rights to collective interests).  
120 For Kant, the protection of individual rights is based upon the premise that every human being 
has autonomy and self-worth, and should be treated as an end rather than means.  Thus, it reflects 
the categorical imperative laid out by Kant: “all rational beings stand under the law that each of 
them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends 
in themselves.” IMMANUAL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 (1997).  
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submerged lands, to public squares and parks. People have equal entitlements in 
this regard because they share collective interests in those resources. Collective 
interests, in this context, are indistinguishable and unassignable shares of those 
resources enjoyed by the people as members of the public. Put differently, the 
public trust resources are by nature taken as an integral whole for members of the 
public rather than divisible and discrete parts available to be used by any 
particular persons. 121  
 
On the other hand, the collective rights protected by the public trust doctrine are 
not alienable in any circumstances. In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court 
enunciated a general rule governing allocation of public trust resources by 
mandating that “control of the State for the purposes of the [public] trust can 
never be lost.” Therefore, under this general rule, the government as the trustee of 
natural resources shall never revoke the public’s collective rights and further trade 
them away with the transferring of the public trust resources to private parties. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court also laid down two exceptions to the general rule of 
inalienability by prescribing that government can transfer the public trust 
resources to private parties only if (1) they “are used in promoting the interests of 
the public”; or (2) the transfer is made “without any substantial impairment of the 
public interest.”122 Therefore, these two exceptions show that the collective rights 
in the public trust resources are not alienable even in the circumstances where the 
government transfers the ownership of a resource to a private party.  In other 
words, given the inalienability of the collective rights, the public can still exercise 
their rights in the privately owned public trust resources.  
 
2. Collective Rights in Public Trust Informational Resources   
The conventional mode of copyright protection, to a large extent, remains silent 
on the legal status of the general public (users of copyrighted materials) in our 
cultural ecosystem. While copyright law is replete with explicit itemizations of 
the bundle of economic rights enjoyed by creators, it does not, as a routine, 
expressly itemizes the bundle of rights that ought to be conferred upon members 
of the public for them to assert collective interests in knowledge and information. 
Not surprisingly, the conventional mode of copyright protection has given rise to 
a widely-held mentality that sees securing adequate protection of economic rights 
enjoyed by creators as the priority of copyright law.123 
                                                 
121 In Arnold v. Mundy, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick of New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that all 
navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows and the coasts of the sea, including the water and 
land under the water, are “common to all the citizens, and that each [citizen] has a right to use 
them according to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate that use ....” 6 N.J.L. 1, 
93 (1821). In a recent water resource case, the Hawaii Supreme Court boldly affirmed that “the 
public trust doctrine applies to all water resources, unlimited by any surface-ground distinction.” 
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97, 135 (2000). 
122 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452-53.  
123 Harper & Row epitomizes the mentality that the core of copyright law is to protect authors’ 
economic rights. In this case, the Supreme Court held that that the defendant’s quotation of 300 
words from the unpublished 200,000-word manuscript of former President Gerald R. Ford could 
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a. The Scope of the Collective Rights for the Public  
The introduction of the public trust doctrine into copyright law would first help us 
to counter the copyright holder-centered mentality, and further help us to think 
about and ascertain the scope of rights that ought to be enjoyed by the general 
public. For this purpose, I propose that akin to their public rights in certain natural 
resources, the public shall be accorded with the following three general categories 
of collective rights over public trust informational resources.  
 
·The Right to Environmental Protection. The public has the right to have our 
cultural ecosystem environmentally well-protected.124 Any activities that cause 
serious environmental pollution in our cultural ecosystem would violate this right 
enjoyed by the public.  
 
·The Right to Cultural Participation. The public has the right to fully 
participate in the cultural life by freely expressing their opinions and engaging in 
research and creativity activities. 125  The enjoyment of this right shall not be 
unduly hampered by the government and private parties through tightening up 
proprietary control over knowledge and information.  
 
·The Right to Benefit from Technological Development. The public has the 
right to enjoy the benefits from technological advances in communicating 
knowledge and information. This right guarantees that technological advances of 
that type could be encouraged and protected, and further requires that state should 
ensure that the public has adequate access to these technologies.126 
                                                                                                                                     
not constitute fair use, even though the quotations related to a historical event of undoubted 
significance for the public interest (the resignation and pardon of President Richard M. Nixon). 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557. 
124 In addition to the support from the public trust doctrine, this right can further find its grounding 
in Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration which states that “Man has the fundamental right to 
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life 
of dignity and well-being.” 
125  Similarly, this right can find a strong grounding in human rights law. For example, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights places much emphasis on the requirement that states 
should allow citizens to enjoy full latitude in 
“freely [participating] in the cultural life of the community.” UDHR, art. 27.1. In this sense, 
cultural participation is the very realm of life that is free of unreasonable state surveillance, 
interference, and coercion. Moreover, under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, states shall adopt various measures to “achieve the full realization of [the] right 
[to cultural participation].” The measures include “those necessary for the conservation, the 
development and the diffusion of science and culture.” Moreover, states shall “respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.” See, CESCR, arts. 15.2-15.3.   
126 This right is derived from the public right in navigable waters for navigation and commerce.  
The public trust doctrine protects this right because it aims to ensure the public at large can 
benefits from the openness of navigable waters for navigation and commerce. As the convenience 
afforded by science and technology has become an indispensable part of human life, the right “to 
share in scientific advancement and its benefits” has been enshrined in human rights treaties as 
well. See, UDHR, art. 27.1; CESCR, art. 15.1 (b). 
34 
 
  
b. The Nature of the Collective Rights for the Public 
Apart from ascertaining the scope of the public’s rights in informational resources, 
the public trust doctrine would further help us to rethink the nature of rights that 
ought to be enjoyed by the public, and to generate new legal techniques to protect 
the public’s rights. As a result, the use of the public trust of doctrine would lead to 
a better-balanced approach to address many thorny issues that may arise in the 
process of copyright adjudication or policy-making.  
 
Similar to their rights over certain natural resources, the public’s rights over 
informational resources are collectively held by the public at large, given that 
every individual has a social membership in the cultural ecosystem of the 
intangible public space. Moreover, the public’s collective rights are by nature 
indivisible and inalienable. The indivisibility requirement entails that each public 
member’s interest in informational resources is equally counted and inextricably 
intertwined with one another. The prevention of one member of the public from 
exercising his public rights would result in harming both his as well as other 
fellow members’ interests in access to and use of informational resources. On the 
other hand, the inalienability requirement generally mandates that the government 
cannot trade away their rights over informational resources when it grants creators 
with copyright in the informational resources concerned. Therefore, the 
combination of the indivisibility and inalienability requirements prompts both the 
government and the courts to vigilantly examine the impact of proprietary control 
over informational resources on the realization of the public’s collective rights.  
 
For the government, the public trust doctrine would mandate that it shall not grant 
new exclusive rights or expand the existing exclusive rights for creators under the 
circumstances that such decisions would purely give them greater economic 
benefits while providing no or marginal benefits to the public at large. Therefore, 
the government must take positive measures to fully examine and scrutinize the 
impact of any proposed expansion of copyright protection on the public interest in 
access to and use of informational resources.  
 
Being indivisible and inalienable, the public’s collective rights protected by the 
doctrine further require the courts to adopt a broad-based approach fully 
sympathetic to the social values of public access to and use of informational 
resources. To this end, courts need to go beyond the conventional wisdom which 
teaches that the limitations on copyright are tailor-made to protecting relevant 
users’ individual interest in informational resources. Put differently, the 
conventional wisdom sees the limitations on copyright as only functioning to 
protect the rights individually enjoyed by users of informational resources. The 
fair use doctrine, for example, is conventionally recognized as the “affirmative 
defense” available for a user to defeat a particular infringement claim alleged 
against him or her. 127  Courts following this approach routinely examine only 
                                                 
127 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. 
35 
 
whether the interest of an individual user involved in the dispute should be 
protected by the fair use doctrine. Rather, they rarely consider the extent to which 
that individual party’s interest has any correlation with the interests of the public 
at large.  For example, in Harper & Row, the Supreme Court held that that The 
Nation’s quotation of 300 words from the unpublished 200,000-word manuscript 
of former President Gerald Ford could not constitute fair use, even though the 
quotations related to a historical event of undoubted significance for the public 
interest. In rending such a decision, the Court did not examine the quotations per 
se would produce any public benefits, say promoting democracy through 
protecting the free flow of information and freedom of expression. Instead, the 
Court seemed to focus on the impact of the unauthorized use on the market value 
of the copyrighted work.128 In particular, it concluded that “[i]t is fundamentally 
at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that 
are of greatest importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major premise 
of copyright and injures author and public alike. ‘[To] propose that fair use be 
imposed whenever the 'social value [of dissemination] . . . outweighs any 
detriment to the artist,' would be to propose depriving copyright owners of their 
right in the property precisely when they encounter those users who could afford 
to pay for it.’”129 
By hailing the “market value” factor as the “undoubtedly the single most 
important element of fair use,”130 Harper & Row and its progenies131 foreclosed 
fair use by only weighing the individual interest/right in accessing and using 
works against the copyright holder’s economic interest. This led Harper & Row to 
ignore the fact that The Nation’s quoting 300 words of the Ford manuscript was in 
effect vital to lending authenticity and understanding to its news reporting of the 
historical event of the resignation and pardon of former President Richard Nixon. 
To keep the public informed of the details of that historical event undoubtedly 
                                                 
128 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-69. 
129 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (citing Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600, 1615 (1982)). 
130 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
131 See e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930-31 (“It is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek 
payment for a particular use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor 
when the means for paying for such a use is made easier... . An unauthorized use should be 
considered ‘less fair’ when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use.”); Castle Rock 
Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 1998). See also, NETANEL, supra 
note 11, at 64-65 (“Since Harper & Row, the Blackstonian property-centered view of fair use has 
steadily gained ground. Courts have repeatedly invoked the bare possibility licensing in potential 
markets for the copyright holder’s work to deny fair use and have insisted that while evidence of 
market harm generally dooms a fair use claim, the absence of such evidence in no way guarantees 
that the use will be deemed fair.”); Carol M. Silberberg, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the 
Twenty-First Century, 74 U.S.C. L. REV. 617, 618 (2001)(expressing concern that courts will give 
too much emphasis to licensing as a solution to market failure in educational settings); Wendy J. 
Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public’s Right to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid the 
‘Fared Use’ Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 619. 
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“furthered the public interest” 132 in “a broad dissemination of principles, ideas, 
and factual information [that] is crucial to the robust public debate and informed 
citizenry….”133 In fact, the opinions rendered by Harper & Row and its progenies 
share the same “market value” mentality with Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, in which the Supreme Court invalidated regulatory taking of 
landowner’s property  on the ground that it caused “deprivation of all 
economically viable use” of the property.134 Yet such a justification based purely 
on examining the “market value” factor or the economic injury to the property 
owner was simply made without careful scrutinizing the fact that the regulatory 
taking in question carried stronger public interest in preserving the natural 
ecosystem in the beachfront areas.135  
 
As I pointed out in my early work, the Harper & Row-type judicial practice which 
is based upon the notion that seeing fair use as an individual right, “would give 
rise to the problem that [the public’s] rights are automatically ‘ranked’ lower than 
copyrights” and “courts actually water down the importance of protecting public 
interest.”136 When dealing with those fair use cases, courts in fact barely took the 
larger public interest into their account. This would lead to the serious 
consequences that “[t]he progress of arts and sciences and the robust public 
debate essential to an enlightened citizenry are ill served by this constricted 
reading of the fair use doctrine.”137 
 
By contrast, the judicial practice of the public trust doctrine consistently shows 
that courts have given priority to the considering of the values of the public 
interest. Thus, it follows that courts should examine broadly the impact of a single 
state or private action on the public interest at large. For example, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court concluded that “any balancing between public and private 
                                                 
132 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
133 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 582 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
134 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). In this case, David H. 
Lucas purchased in 1986 two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South 
Carolina. However, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management Act (1990)  which 
resuled in barring Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels. Thus, 
the central question the Court dealt with in Lucas was ecologically based shoreline regulations 
which prohibit further development constitute a taking of the landowner’s property. 
135 The recent taking jurisprudence shows that the Supreme Court has parted with the so-called 
categorical rule in deciding regulatory taking is valid or not. See Palazzolo v.Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302 (2002).  For a detailed discussion about these issues, see Laura Underkuffler, 
Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property and Justice, 21 Constitutional 
Commentary 727 (2004). 
136 Sun, supra note 13, at 321. This sort of automatic watering-down of public’s rights could be 
further found in an opinion made in Eldred: “The First Amendment securely protects the freedom 
to make-or decline to make-one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right 
to make other people’s speeches.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
137 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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purposes [shall] begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and 
enjoyment.”138  
 
To promote and protect the three categories of collective rights enjoyed by the 
general public, courts therefore need to alter their interpretive methodologies and 
judicial techniques for adjudicating copyright cases, in particular for those fair use 
cases. The public trust doctrine would require that when adjudicating copyright 
cases, courts need to bear in mind that the public’s rights are by nature collective 
rights rather than individual rights. This would require courts not to interpret the 
fair use doctrine restrictively. Accordingly, sufficient consideration of the public 
interest shall be made in the process of rendering judicial decisions. Rather than 
fixing their focus on individual interest, courts shall look broadly to the spectrum 
of public interests and their ramifications for public access and use of 
informational resources. 139  For example, when interpreting the nature of fair 
dealing exception which is similar to the fair use doctrine in U.S., the Canadian 
Supreme Court in fact largely used the ethos of the public trust doctrine as 
described above to promote the collective rights in informational resources 
enjoyed by the public: 
 
The fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a 
user’s right.  In order to maintain the proper balance between the rights of a 
copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively….  
“Research” must be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure 
that users’ rights are not unduly constrained…. “Dealing” connotes not 
individual acts, but a practice or system.  This comports with the purpose of 
the fair dealing exception, which is to ensure that users are not unduly 
restricted in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted works. Persons or 
                                                 
138 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97, 142(2000); In re Waiola O Molokai, 
Inc.103 Hawai'i 401, 432 (2004) (reaffirming this argument made in the former case). See Carol 
Necole Brown, Drinking from a Deep Well: The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law, 
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (“Public rights are just as essential to a healthy and functioning 
democratic society as are private rights, and strengthening the public trust doctrine ensures that 
public resources are not turned over to private owners, essentially consolidating usufructuary 
interests in important waters in the hands of a few and to the exclusion of the public.”). 
139  See e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses at 25, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323834 (“Courts should give greater weight to the public’s interest in 
access to the information the defendant’s use would make available. Particularly in cases 
involving free speech and free expression values, courts can and should give more consideration to 
the public interest in access to the defendants’ expression.”); BURRELL&ALLISON COLEMAN, 
COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT 279-80 (2005) (proposing that the 
limitations on copyright shall be seen as users’ rights and they “can be objected that different 
users’ rights are justified by very different societal interests”); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 257, 331 (2006) (arguing that “[i]ntellectual property is about social relations and should 
serve human values”); Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom 
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 50 (2004) (“To make intellectual 
property consistent with the idea of free speech as democratic culture, there must be a robust and 
ever expanding public domain with generous fair use rights. Intellectual property also must not be 
permitted to create chokepoints or bottlenecks in the spread of knowledge and the distribution of 
culture.”). 
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institutions relying on the … fair dealing exception need only prove that their 
own dealings with copyrighted works were for the purpose of research or 
private study and were fair.  They may do this either by showing that their 
own practices and policies were research-based and fair, or by showing that all 
individual dealings with the materials were in fact research-based and fair.140 
 
On the other hand, the public trust doctrine could also be used to counter the 
general rule regarding the burden of proof that has been used by courts in dealing 
with fair use cases. Court’s treating fair use as users’ individual rights and 
consequently the affirmative defense for them has, as shown above, led courts to 
routinely place on the defendant the burden of proof to demonstrate his act is in 
line with the fair use doctrine. 141 The shifting of burden of proof, as it stands, 
simply presumes that fair use is in fact “the right to hire a lawyer to defend [one’s] 
right to create,”142 unduly making it more costly and complicated for members of 
the public to defend their rights.143  Worse still, it also takes for granted that 
copyright as an individual right should be given greater weight than the collective 
rights enjoyed by the public.  
 
By contrast, the ethos of the public trust doctrine, if applied to the fair use cases, 
would require courts to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff, namely the copy 
holders especially those big entertainment and publishing companies.144 Through 
                                                 
140 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 1 S.C.R. 399 (2004) (emphases added), 
available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2004/2004scc13/2004scc13.html. A less liberal or 
ambitious interpretation of the fair use doctrine, though showing strong sympathy for the need to 
protecting the public interest, has been made by some U.S. courts. See  Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis 
Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding in favor of fair use in part because 
““[t]here is a public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President 
Kennedy.”); Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1283 (pointing out that if copyright holders had the right to 
prevent others from making parody of their works, that would have made “a policy that would 
extend intellectual property protection into the precincts of censorship”); Blanch v. Koons, 467 
F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that “the public exhibition of art is widely and [it has] value 
that benefits the broader public interest”).  
141 See e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (“Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent 
would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence 
about relevant markets. “);Texaco, 60 F.3d at 918 (“Fair use serves as an affirmative defense to a 
claim of copyright infringement, and thus the party claiming that its secondary use of the original 
copyrighted work constitutes a fair use typically carries the burden of proof as to all issues in the 
dispute.”); Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, H.R. Rep. No. 102-836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 n.3 
(1992) (concluding that the burden “is always on the party asserting the defense, regardless of the 
type of relief sought by the copyright owner….”). 
142 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 187 (2005). 
143 To borrow words from Lessig, defending fair use as individual rights “costs too much, it 
delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection the justice underlying the claim. 
The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a 
tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.” See LESSIG, supra note 142., at 187.  
144 Pamela Samuelson also points out that in fair use cases the burden of proof shall in general be 
placed on the copyright holders:  
       Given the important role that fair use plays in mediating tensions between copyright law 
and the First Amendment and other constitutional values, it would be appropriate for the 
burden of showing unfairness to be on the copyright owner. When deciding whether to 
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shifting the burden of proof, courts would show that their following the ethos of 
the public trust doctrine requires them to give appropriate primacy to the rights 
collectively enjoyed by the public and to the promotion and protection of public 
interest. In this sense, it is the possibility that collective rights enjoyed by the 
public could potentially gain primacy over the individual right in copyrighted 
works that provides the ground of shifting the burden of proof to the copyright 
holders. Moreover, the shifting of the burden of proof in this regard would further 
open the door for courts to engage in a more expansive scrutiny of the subtleties 
and nuances of the public interest that could be promoted, should the plaintiff’s 
copying of works is to be upheld as fair use. Besides, it would encourage 
members of the public to assert their rights more actively and spontaneously 
rather than simply succumb to copyright holders’ demands for licensing fees. This 
is because the shift of the burden of proof would significantly reduce their costs to 
participate in litigations and make it quicker to settle disputes so that their 
activities would not be unduly hampered by the exceedingly complex, lengthy and 
costly litigation process.  
B. Effectuating the Government’s Political Responsibilities  
1. Political Responsibilities Regarding Public Trust Natural Resources  
Under the public trust doctrine, the government has the trustee power to regulate 
or dispose of natural resources. Meanwhile, the government is required by the 
doctrine to fulfill its political responsibility to promote and protect the public’s 
collective rights over certain natural resources. For example, it has been 
repeatedly emphasized that the government has “the right and the duty to protect 
and preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not 
derive from ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the people.”145   
 
To ensure that the government would fulfill its political responsibilities, the public 
trust doctrine confers upon courts the judicial review power to consider the 
validity of government’s state action in allocating the protected resources. 
According to the judicial practice, courts examine whether or not the 
government’s allocation of public trust resources is made for the purpose of 
promoting public interests. For example, with respect to navigable waters and the 
land underneath them, the Supreme Court in Illinois Central stated that “The 
                                                                                                                                     
challenge a use as infringement, rights holders often anticipate that fair use will be at 
issue in the case, and they are typically in a better position than defendants to offer 
proof on key issues pertinent to fair use, such as the likelihood of harm to the market. 
See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses at70, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323834. 
I am grateful to Ng-Loy Wee Loon for directing me to Pamela Samuelson’s latest thought about 
the rule of the burden of proof in the fair use cases after she read an earlier draft of this article.  
145 In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (1980). National Audubon Society 
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 441 (Cal.,1983) (“[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation 
of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the 
state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, 
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is 
consistent with the purposes of the trust.”). 
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control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except [that 
resources] are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be 
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands 
and waters remaining.”146 Accordingly, if the results of state action cannot live up 
to the standard of review enunciated in Illinois Central, courts would invalidate 
the government’s decisions regarding allocation of public trust resources, and 
would denounce its “abdication”147 of the political responsibility to protect the 
public’s collective rights. 
 
The judicial oversight of the state action regarding its allocation of public trust 
resources, in effect, empowers the court to overturn the decisions made by the 
government as the representative of the public at large. Anti-majoritarian as it is, 
the public trust doctrine as the basis of the judicial review power is legitimized by 
its role in remedying “the tyranny of the minority” problem that may arise in the 
democratic decision-making process. The conundrum inherent in the modern 
democracy, as Carl Schmitt observed, is that political institutions as the venue for 
deliberating public good may have been transformed into the institutions for 
powerful interest groups to negotiate and bargain for commercial deals of power 
distribution. Those powerful interest groups, routinely formed by large business 
organizations, are the “minority” parties in the society when compared to the 
public as the “majority” whose collective interest are supposed to be of central 
importance in democratic governance. Yet these “minority” groups are able to 
drastically reduce the inclusive deliberation in the legislative and administrative 
process to the business meeting concerning the distribution of interests among 
them. Because they wield an unparalleled wealth of resources, these “minority” 
groups are extremely active in penetrating the structure of democratic deliberation 
by controlling some or most of the representatives of the public, such as senators, 
governors, etc. When these representatives become their “loudspeakers” in the 
political decision-making process, the democratic deliberation would degenerate 
into “an empty formality” and “superfluous decoration” 148 for the public interest 
at large. Their conduct, in Carl Schmitt’s opinion, is no longer “concerned with 
discovering what is rationally correct, but with calculating particular interests and 
the chances of wining and with carrying these through according the one’s own 
interests.”149 
  
The state action regarding allocation of natural resource is indeed very vulnerable 
to the “tyranny of the minority” problem as discussed above. Given that public 
trust resources have enormous market value, any proprietary control of them 
would surely generate windfall profits for any private parties. Not surprisingly, 
                                                 
146  Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. 
147  Id. (“Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the 
government of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the public.”). 
148 CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 6 (E. Kennedy trans. 1988).  
149 Id. at 5-6. Therefore, the politics of the deliberation degenerates into regular business meeting 
in which “social or economic power-groups caculat[e] their mutual interests and opportunities for 
power, and they actually agree compromises and coalitions on this basis.” 
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this gives rise to the rent-seeking activities150 that may be aggressively pursued by 
the private parties with strong economic clout.151 Through bribing or lobbying 
governmental officials in power, these parties take possession of a public trust 
resource. On the other hand, the public at large is always diffuse and unorganized. 
It is relatively hard to get them organized as a concerted voice to take part in the 
government’s decision-making process associated with the allocation of public 
trust resources. Too often, the public at large is simply unable to wage struggle to 
counter the powerful rent-seeking activities performed by large corporations.  
 
Based upon the public trust doctrine, the exercise of the judicial review power by 
courts plays an important role in preventing or altering the state action of 
allocating natural resources which has been skewed by rent-seeking activities.  As 
Sax insightfully observed, the public trust doctrine “is a technique by which 
courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative 
process.”152 To do so, the doctrine empowers the courts to “promote equality of 
political power for [the] disorganized and diffused [public as the] majority” 
whose interest is easily jeopardized by the “self-interested and powerful 
minorities [who] often have undue influence on” governmental resource 
management. 153   Therefore, courts derive and legitimatize the judicial review 
power from the need to protect the public’s collective rights against the tyranny of 
the minority that may occur in the process of government’s allocating of public 
trust informational resources.  
 
2. Political Responsibilities Regarding Public Trust Informational Resources  
With respect to copyright protection, the law-making process regarding the 
allocation of informational resources does suffer from the “tyranny of the 
minority” problem intensified by the rent-seeking activities as well. Legislative 
bodies, by and large, have been heavily lobbied and persistently controlled by the 
major copyright-based industries, which primarily include entertainment 
corporations, publishers, and collective management organizations.154   
 
In the digital age, informational resources increasingly have higher market value. 
To a large extent, they are the lifeblood of any knowledge-based economies. Akin 
to the situation in natural resources, the increased value in having ownership of 
informational resources has been driving more and more corporations in the 
copyright-based industry to persuade the legislature into adopting laws that 
provide stronger copyright protection. Against this backdrop, the relevant 
                                                 
150 Rent-seeking is the expenditure of resources in an effort to capture these supra-normal returns. 
Lobbying for special legislative privileges is a classic example. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., 
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (1980). 
151  The rent seeking problem in natural resources management, see Ragnar Torvik, Natural 
Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare, 67 JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 455 (2002). 
152 Sax, supra note 42, at 509.  
153 Id. at 560.  
154 See general Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J. L. & 
ARTS. 61, 65-67 (2002); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22-76 (2001). 
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industries first negotiate the deals to protect their interests and then forge a 
coalition to bring them to fruition in Congress. They hire experts to draft 
legislative proposals aimed at amending law to beef up copyright protection. They 
further send lobbying representatives to present eloquently to members of 
Congress how useful and reasonable their proposals are. The prevailing presence 
of the copyright-based industry in the legislature process has persistently led to 
increased protection of copyright, making them have stronger power to tighten up 
the flow of informational resources. The scope of the exclusive rights that control 
access to and use of information contained in works of authorship has been 
increasingly enlarged. At the same time, however, the legislature has kept 
narrowing down the limitations on those exclusive rights which give room for the 
public to use information contained in works.155  
 
The legislative expansion of copyright protection, however, has been made 
without much consideration of its social costs to public access to and use of 
informational resources. In many cases, the legislative proposals submitted by the 
representatives form the relevant copyright-based industries were overwhelmingly 
adopted by Congress without much close scrutiny over their impact on public 
interests. “Much legislation advances the agendas of private interest 
groups.…Congress in effect agreed that if the industry representatives would 
invest the time and energy to develop a bill that all of them endorsed, Congress 
would refrain from exercising independent judgment on the substance of the 
legislation.”156 In this one-sided process, legislators were preoccupied with the 
rhetoric that the stronger copyright protection would necessarily give copyright 
holders stronger economic incentive to produce and disseminate works, resulting 
in increased amount and availability of works for the public. Such rhetoric, 
however, has only been touted by the industry representatives. Legislators 
routinely shy away from interrogating whether stronger protection would bring 
about either stronger economic incentive to produce works or substantial benefits 
for the public. Therefore, it is not surprisingly that legislative expansions of 
copyright “often consist of outright congressional rubber-stamping of industry-
drafted legislative and committee reports.”157 
 
The expanding of exclusive rights as well as the narrowing of copyright 
limitations, without a doubt, has an enormous impact on the public’s access to and 
use of informational resources. Yet the public at large has failed to have their 
concerns voiced in the law-making process and to further have them seriously 
scrutinized by legislators. This is primarily because the public, akin to their 
                                                 
155 See text accompanying supra notes 93-95 .   
156 Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 314 
(1989) (footnotes omitted); Jessica Litman , Copyright,  Comprise and Legislative History, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860-61 (1987) (“Indeed, the statute’s legislative history is troubling 
because it reveals that most of the statutory language was not drafted by members of Congress or 
their staffs at all. Instead, the language evolved through a process of negotiation among authors, 
publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the property rights the statute defines.”). 
157 NETANEL, supra note 11, at 184. 
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circumstances in the government’s decision-making process regarding allocation 
of natural resource s, is too diffuse and unorganized to launch backlash against 
excessive expansion of copyright protection. Also, as laymen of copyright law, 
the majority of the public are prone to take it granted that copyright expansion 
does not have much to do with them. Too often, the public at large is 
unfortunately not aware of the ramifications of copyright expansions for their 
interests even after the relevant law is adopted.158  
 
Among numerous amendments to copyright law, the Copyright Term Extension 
Act epitomizes the fact that the law-making process has been one-sidedly 
dominated and skewed by the copyright-based industries. 159  Throughout its 
legislative history, the Congressional hearings were persistently dominated by 
pro-copyright testimonies. As a result, the CTEA was adopted on the basis of 
these testimonies.160 Indeed, it become evident that the “tyranny of the minority” 
problem that exists in the government’s allocation of natural resource, has 
plagued the copyright lawmaking as well. Against this backdrop, courts can and 
should act as the guardian for the public to question whether government has 
fulfilled its political responsibilities regarding allocation of informational 
resources.161 To this end, they can rely on the public trust doctrine to urge the 
government to engage in open and rational process of democratic deliberation, 
when they proceed to allocate informational resources through enacting copyright 
laws.  
 
                                                 
158 NETANEL, supra note 11, at 184 (“In contrast to well-heeled interest groups, the public consists 
of a large number of discrete individuals, each with a small, highly diffuse stake in the regulation 
at issue. As a result, the general public faces serious organizational obstacles to countering 
industry lobbying, and when industries lobby for speech entitlements, the underrepresented public 
interest in free speech is likely to be shortchanged.”). 
159 See LESSIG, supra note 142, at 218 (noting that more than two-thirds of the original sponsors of 
CTEA in the House and Senate received contributions from Disney and that “Disney is estimated 
to have contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the 1998 cycle”); Christina N. 
Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 385-86 (2000) 
(“In fact, ten of the thirteen sponsors of the bill in the House received contributions from Disney, 
and eight of the twelve sponsors in the Senate were given money by Disney's political action 
committee. Disney also made a $ 20,000 donation to the National Republican Senatorial 
Committee two weeks after Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott signed the bill. Other notable 
lobbyists included the Gershwin family, whose copyright on George Gershwin's ‘Rhapsody in 
Blue’ was due to expire in 1999, and other acclaimed artists like Bob Dylan and Quincy Jones.”). 
160 See Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 199, 206-222 (2002).  
161 See Merges, supra note 11, at 2239 (arguing that “in an age of increasing ‘statutorification’ in 
intellectual property law, the system needs a counterweight where the legislative process is 
skewed.”); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 272, 362 (2004) (“Although intellectual property rights can be dispensed in both unfair and 
economically harmful ways, recognizing a constitutional norm against successful rent-seeking 
would require rolling back much of what government has done in the twentieth century and would 
simply place an additional hurdle - judicial approval - in the way of making federal economic 
policy.”).  
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To excise the judicial review power, courts could examine the substantive and 
procedural aspects of the state action in allocating of informational resources. For 
the substantive value, they could rely on the standard of review used by Illinois 
Central to determine whether the government has fulfilled its political 
responsibilities. To this end, courts need to consider whether the government’s 
granting of stronger proprietary control over informational resources would 
benefit the public or cause substantive harm to the public interest.162  Moreover, 
the doctrine shifts the burden of proof to the government, requiring it to 
demonstrate the strong public-interest purpose in granting stronger copyright 
protection. At this juncture, the shift of the burden of proof compels the 
government to disclose the potentially hidden details concerning how and why 
informational resources in question have been privatized or afforded with stronger 
proprietary protection.   
 
Second, in terms of the procedural issues, courts could examine whether the 
adoption of copyright laws has adequately taken into account the interests of 
major stakeholders through open and fair procedures. 163 To this end, the court 
could consider whether decisions are made with a great deal of public notice so as 
to keep the public reasonably informed and give them sufficient time to get 
prepared and organized to respond and counteract. In particular, the doctrine 
further requires that the legislative body must take accommodative measures to 
have the representatives of the public closely involved in the law-making process. 
For example, legislative body may invite civil society organizations such as 
Public Knowledge, Electronic Frontier Foundation, etc, to present their concerns 
for the impact of any proposed new laws on the public interest in access to 
information. Therefore, courts can strike down the law enacted without close 
participation by the representatives of the public, or order the legislature to revise 
the law by actively having those representatives adequately engaged in the 
legislative process.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
162 Robert Merges has a similar position regarding the role of the judiciary in protecting public 
interest by arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court may have to step in at some point to regulate rent 
seeking in its boldest form,” though he does not make his point from the perspective of the public 
trust doctrine. See Merges, supra note 11, at 2191, 2238-39 (“A copyright term incapable of 
serving as an incentive at any plausible discount rate; a private patent bill tucked into an unrelated 
piece of legislation granting a long extension for no justifiable reason: in these and similar cases, 
an inquiry into the legislative process seems a relevant consideration. In a close case, that inquiry 
should tip the balance. A court could then invalidate the statute, returning the issue to Congress.”) 
163 See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (1986) (empirical research shows that lobbying is most effective when the interest 
group's goals are narrow and the legislation involves issues of “low-visibility” from the general 
public's perspective). 
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C. Enforcing the Copyright Holders’ Social Responsibilities 
1. The Property Holders’ Social Responsibilities  
Apart from acting as the check on state action, the public trust doctrine also 
constrains private action under the circumstances in which the public needs must 
be accommodated in the privately controlled resources. On the one hand, courts 
have invoked the doctrine to order opening of private property to accommodate 
public access and use. In this circumstance, courts routinely ascertain that public 
access to or use of the relevant private property is the condition on which the 
public can meaningfully exercise their collective rights over trust resources. In 
courts’ opinion, without taking any accommodative measures for the public, 
property owners would seriously impinge on, if not effectively eliminate, the 
collective rights of the public. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
acknowledged that “[e]xercise of the public’s right to swim and bathe below the 
mean high water mark may depend upon a right to pass across the upland beach. 
Without some means of access the public right to use the foreshore would be 
meaningless.”164 Hence, the Court ruled that the public must be afforded with 
both access to and use of privately-owned upland beach (dry sand areas) as 
reasonably necessary for them to exercise their public trust right to bathe or swim 
in the foreshore areas.  
 
On the other hand, under the public trust doctrine, the private parties who 
obtained ownership of pubic trust resources from the government are required to 
accommodate public access to and use of those resources in their proprietary 
control.  Under this circumstance, the private ownership conferred by the 
government is seen as a bifurcated title. On the one hand, the party has acquired 
private ownership over the resource concerned.  This title of ownership, under the 
common law, is recognized as jus privatum. Yet the title is subject to the public’s 
collective rights over the resources concerned. On the other hand, the common 
law regards the public’s collective rights over public trust resources as jus 
publicum protected by the state.165 The bifurcated title over the privatized public 
trust resources shows that while the government can alienate public trust 
resources on appropriate occasions, it must not give up and abdicate the 
responsibilities to protect public interests in those resources. Despite the 
government’s alienation of public trust resources, the public therefore can still 
exercise their rights over those privately controlled resources obtained from 
                                                 
164 Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 323 (1984). Moreover, in an earlier case the 
court also stated that “A modern court must take the view that the public trust doctrine dictates 
that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference.” 
Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309 (1972).   
165 See e.g. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 US 1,11 (1894) (holding that “the title, jus privatum, in 
[tidelands] … belongs to the king, as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is 
vested in him, as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit”); Appleby v. City of 
New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926) (ruling that the ownership of submerged lands carrying both the 
jus publicum and the jus privatum); Glass v. Goeckel, 473 Mich. 667, 680 (2005) (“Jus publicum 
refers to public rights in navigable waters and the land covered by those waters; jus privatum, in 
contrast, refers to private property rights held subject to the public trust.”). 
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government’s privatization schemes.166 For example, regarding the littoral rights 
granted by the government, courts repeatedly held that “although the state retains 
the authority to convey lakefront property to private parties, it necessarily conveys 
such property subject to the public trust.”167  
 
By requiring the public accommodation in private property, the public trust 
doctrine, in fact, imposed upon property owners both negative and positive social 
responsibilities. For the negative responsibility, the doctrine requires that private 
property owners not to use their property in a manner harmful to the public for 
them to exercise their collective rights under the public trust doctrine. In fact, the 
imposition of negative responsibilities reflects a long-recognized principle that 
“all property … is held under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it 
shall not be injurious to the community”168 and other individuals.169 For instance, 
in Orion Corp. v. State, Orion Corporation, the owner of 5,600 acres of Padilla 
Bay tidelands in Washington attempted to dredge and fill Padilla Bay to create a 
residential community. Yet the court held that Orion’s purchase of the tidelands 
was subject to the public trust and must accommodate the public need, given that 
the state could not give up jus publicum interest for all the citizens. Hence, Orion 
Corporation has the responsibility not to carrying out dredging and filling of the 
tidelands at issue that “would substantially impair the public rights of navigation 
and fishing, as well as incidental rights and purposes [for boating, swimming, 
water skiing].” 170  Similarly, filling of tidal waters was also invalidated by 
Palazzolo v. State171 based on the public trust doctrine. Moreover, courts have 
also held that private owners have the responsibility not to erect fences on their 
properties, which would prevent the public from exercising the right to walk on 
the lake shores below the ordinary high water mark172 or to navigate in the lake 
waters.173  
 
                                                 
166 See e.g. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wn.2d 662, 669 (1987) (“The state can no more convey or give 
away this jus publicum interest than it can ‘abdicate its police powers in the administration of 
government and the preservation of the peace.’”) (citing Illinois Central); Glass v. Goeckel, 473 
Mich. at 679 (“At common law, our courts articulated a distinction between jus privatum and jus 
publicum to capture this principle: the alienation of littoral property to private parties leaves intact 
public rights in the lake and its submerged land.”). 
167 Glass v. Goeckel, 473 Mich. at 679. 
168 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1897).  
169 For example, Justice Brandeis contended that “the right of the owner to use his land is not 
absolute. He may not so use it as to create a public nuisance; and uses, once harmless, may, owing 
to changed conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (1922).   
170 Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621,638-42 (1987). In an earlier case, the court required 
littoral property owners to remove fills that prevented submergence of their shoreline and thus 
impeded their neighbors’ access to the adjoining lake. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wn.2d 306 (1969). 
171 Not Reported in A.2d, 2005 WL 1645974, 7, (R.I.Super.,2005). 
172 See e.g. Glass v. Goeckel, 473 Mich. at 699.  
173 See e.g. Lincoln v. Davis, 53 Mich. 375, 390 (1884) (“[T]here can be no doubt of the right of 
the state to forbid any erections within such parts of the water as are strictly navigable, and to 
regulate the distance beyond which no private erections can be maintained.”). 
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With respect to the positive responsibility, private property owners are required 
by the public trust doctrine to take on certain set of tasks to facilitate the public’s 
exercising of their collective rights. For instance, given that access to and use of 
dry sand areas are indispensable for the public to make recreational use of the 
foreshore areas, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered that private property 
rights was required to afford the public not only “reasonable access to the 
foreshore” but also “a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand.”174  
 
2. The Copyright Holders’ Social Responsibilities  
Given that the core of the conventional copyright law is the protection of creators’ 
economic rights, the law per se is largely silent on whether copyright holders have 
social responsibilities. The designing of copyright law, therefore, inculcates a 
popular mentality in copyright holders that armed with the bundle of economic 
rights protected by copyright law, they nevertheless do not have any social 
responsibilities after the publication of their works. Hence they reason that they 
have fulfilled their social responsibilities through publishing their works and 
thereby informing the public of their intellectual creations. It then naturally 
follows that as long as they finish the acting of publishing, they do not have any 
further social responsibilities whatsoever regarding the protection of their 
copyrights. For them, copyright simply denotes the Blackstonian notion of 
property, in which the owner enjoys “sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the 
right of any other individual in the universe.”175   
 
Moreover, Eldred v. Ashcroft lends a strong support for the Blackstonian notion 
of property that divorces exclusive rights enjoyed by copyright holders from the 
social responsibilities that they should have. In Eldred, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that social responsibilities are imposed upon right holders as a quid 
pro quo for vesting them with patent rights.176  Yet, it rejected that the same 
conclusion could be applied to copyright. In doing so, the Court based its denial 
on the distinction between the protections afforded to copyright and patent: 
 
            We note [that] patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange, 
and that our references to a quid pro quo typically appear in the patent 
context . . . . [C]opyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge. 
A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any fact or idea she 
acquires from her reading. The grant of a patent, on the other hand, does 
prevent full use by others of the inventor’s knowledge.177 
 
Without carefully reconsidering the nature of copyright and recent legislative 
overhaul that may change the landscape of copyright protection, the Court’s 
                                                 
174 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 185 N.J. 40, 55 (2005) (citing Matthews). 
175 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 393 (1882). 
176 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216 (holding that the disclosure requirement for patentees should be seen as 
“the price paid for the exclusivity secured”). 
177 Eldred, id. at 216-17. 
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ruling against the requirement of social responsibilities is dubious. With the recent 
expansion of copyright protection, it is not necessarily true that the protection 
afforded to copyright holders, according to the letters of copyright law, does not 
enable them to monopolize any knowledge. For example, it was bluntly pointed 
out in Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade that “the fact that computer programs are 
distributed for public use in object code form often precludes public access to the 
ideas and functional concepts contained in those programs, and thus confers on 
the copyright owner a de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional 
concepts.”178 Moreover, the Court failed to bear in mind that retroactive extension 
of copyright terms and legal protection of technological measures179 and non-
original databases180 actually confer monopoly over ideas upon right holders.  
 
The use of the public trust doctrine would provide us with a vantage point to think 
about why social responsibilities should be imposed upon copyright owners, and 
further how the social responsibilities could be enforced by copyright law. The 
core idea for courts is to think about the relationship between the copyright 
owners and the public at large. First and foremost, borrowing from the techniques 
of the public trust doctrine, courts could consider the imposition of social 
responsibilities on copyright holders based upon the fact that they need to provide 
public accommodation in order to promote and protect the public’s collective 
rights.181 On the one hand, despite the right to exclude vested in copyright holders, 
the public access to and use of the works concerned may constitute the condition 
on which members of the public can exercise their collective rights in a 
meaningful way. As Rebecca Tushnet has convincingly demonstrated, “copying is 
of value to audiences who have access through copying to otherwise unavailable 
speech. It also enhances copiers’ ability to express themselves; to persuade others; 
and to participate in cultural, religious, and political institutions.”182 Therefore, 
courts must examine whether the public at large, if their copying of works is not 
allowed, can still exercise their rights protected by the public trust doctrine in a 
meaningful way.   
 
On the other hand, given that copyright law now affords quasi legal protection 
over ideas and facts through the law of anti-circumvention regulations, courts may 
rely on the public trust doctrine to consider the imposition of social 
responsibilities upon right holders concerned in order to facilitate the public’s 
                                                 
178 Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). 
179 See text accompany supra notes 76-78. 
180 For example,  the sui generis model adopted in E.U. is intended to protect the non-original 
database that contain “qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment” against 
unauthorized “extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part of” the contents 
of that databases. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament of and of the Council of 11 
March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, Art.7.1. The sui generis model makes it 
possible that the maker of databases in fact has the proprietary control over facts and ideas. 
181 For discussion on the equality and reciprocity as the basis of imposing social responsibilities, 
see Sun, supra note 13, at 322-326. 
182 Tushnet, supra note 81, at 562.  
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exercising of rights over those ideas and facts under their control. Unquestionably, 
ideas and facts are not subject to proprietary control and copyright protection. 
Rather, they remain in the public space freely available for the public to use. If the 
government affords quasi copyright protection over certain elements of ideas and 
facts through anti-circumvention regulations or any other forms of copyright 
protection, courts may hold that the relevant copyright owners shall have the 
responsibility to accommodate the exercise of public trust rights over the ideas 
and facts concerned.  
  
By and large, to consider copyright holders’ social responsibilities would provide 
us with a new insight into thinking about the nature of copyright in general and 
the copyright limitations like the fair use doctrine in particular. The use of the 
public trust doctrine in this regard broadens our vision of the nature of copyright 
through postulating that “social responsibility is the very quid pro quo for 
granting a bundle of exclusive rights to [copyright holders].”183 In this sense, we 
do not see the function of copyright law as merely granting economic rights to 
creators or securing adequate copyright protection for them. Rather, copyright law 
also plays an essential role in making it effective that creators with copyright 
protection would contribute to the promoting of the public interest in improving 
accumulation and dissemination of knowledge and information and further in 
enhancing social creativity and innovation in the economic and cultural 
development of our human society. Moreover, with the use of the public trust 
doctrine, we do not simply see the fair use doctrine as merely carving out 
limitations on copyrights vested in creators. Rather, the fair use doctrine should be 
seen as a useful tool to impose social responsibilities upon copyright holders and 
to further enforce the social responsibility of that type. From this perspective, the 
fair use doctrine makes it legally effective that copyright holders would exercise 
their rights in a manner conducive to the promotion and protection of the public’s 
collective rights over informational resources. As I argued in my earlier work, the 
fair use doctrine, if seen from the perspective of social responsibilities, actually 
becomes one of the institutional arrangements aimed at sustaining and enhancing 
the reciprocal relationship between copyright holders (creators) and the general 
public (users): 
 
        According to the principle of reciprocity, as long as users act in a manner 
respectful of copyright, creators should and must be required to do something 
positive to the promotion and protection of users’ rights. In this sense, the grant 
of copyright to creators therefore intrinsically entails the social responsibilities 
imposed upon them. Put differently, users can thereby forcefully petition 
creators to exercise their rights in a manner conducive to the pursuit of public 
good. From this perspective, copyright holders are required to come to terms 
with the socially beneficial use of their works by the public at large. Under 
                                                 
183 Sun, supra note 13, at 328.  
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certain circumstances, they are further required to facilitate such kind of use of 
copyrighted works.184 
 
Yet it does not necessarily follow that courts should invoke the public trust 
doctrine in adjudicating every case to examine whether copyright holders have 
social responsibilities to take measures aimed at accommodating the public. This 
mode of adjudication may cause many conventional copyright doctrines 
dysfunctional in dealing with private law suits. Instead, with respect to the 
copyright holders’ responsibilities, courts should use the public trust doctrine 
merely as a last resort. Only in the circumstances where courts face hard cases 
and find it very difficult to make a decision even after using all of conventional 
doctrinal tools can they start to invoke the public trust doctrine. In this context, 
courts can draw on the public trust doctrine to consider whether the copyright 
holder have social responsibilities to the public. If so, courts can then rule that the 
copyright holder owe responsibilities to the defendant given that he or she is 
presumptively to be a member of the public. In this scenario, the dispute could be 
resolved on the basis of courts’ reasoning of the extent to which social 
responsibilities should be imposed on copyright holders.   
 
IV.  REEGINEERING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE THROUGHT PRACTICE AND 
APPLICATIONS 
Based on preceding discussion about the theories and concrete techniques of the 
public trust doctrine, I will consider how the doctrine could be applied to create 
new alternative ways to deal with the copyright cases which are core to the 
healthy development of our cultural ecosystem.  
A. Overturning Eldred  
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the recent 
twenty-year extension of copyright terms. On the one hand, the Court held that 
the extension was rationally made within the ambit of Congress’ legislative power, 
because the past term extensions were unanimously deemed valid and Congress 
demonstrated legitimate policy judgments for the latest term extension, such as 
the need to keep up with the term extension in European Union, to provide 
economic incentive to produce and disseminate new works and so on. 185  
Therefore, it ruled that the enactment of the CTEA did not violate Copyright 
Clause. On the other hand, the Court held that the CTEA does not violate the First 
Amendment, because it did not change the contours of the idea/expression 
                                                 
184 Sun, supra note 13, at 324. The idea of reciprocity in copyright law was discussed by Lord 
Ellenborough in a very early copyright case, though not in an explicit way. He thought that 
“[w]hile I shall think myself bound to secure in every man the enjoyment of his copyright, one 
must not put manacles on science.” Therefore, he proposed that “a man may fairly adopt part of 
the work of another; he may so make use of another’s labors for the promotion of science, and the 
benefit of the public.” Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170-171 (1803). 
185 Eldred, 537 U.S. at199-208. 
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dichotomy and the fair use doctrine as the so-called “built-in First Amendment 
accommodations” in copyright law.186  
 
The use of the public trust doctrine, however, would render a judicial opinion that 
runs direct counter to Eldred and invalidates the enactment of the CTEA. Given 
that the CTEA’s extension of copyright terms would necessarily grant proprietary 
control over public trust informational resources (without the extension, they 
would have remained in public trust), the Supreme Court can rely on the public 
trust doctrine to exercise its judicial review power to consider whether the CTEA 
is valid or not. 
 
Following the doctrine, the Court first needs to examine whether the substantive 
public values have been infused into the CTEA. To this end, the Court could 
examine whether the term extension promotes public interest or whether it does 
not cause any substantial impairment of the public interest. As show in Part III, 
this is the threshold inquiry required by Illinois Central and many other public 
trust doctrine cases.187 First, judging from the CTEA’s legislative purpose, the 
Court could conclude that its extension of copyright terms was adopted for purely 
benefiting the copyright holders, especially those big entertainment companies. 188 
As the Senate Report and the majority of testimonies delivered at the 
Congressional hearings show, it is evident that the major purpose of the CTEA 
was to provide increased economic benefits to copyright holders.189 Moreover, 
the Court could further consider whether the CTEA would substantively impair 
the public interest. At this juncture, the Court could find that the CTEA would 
hardly provide most of creators more incentive to produce and disseminate more 
works for the public, because it is dubious that their decision-making process 
would take into account the extra twenty-year protection as a motivation for 
acting in that way. Instead, the Court could find that the CTEA may cause grave 
social harms. For example, many economists have estimated that the CTEA 
                                                 
186 Id. at 218-221. 
187 See texts accompanying supra note 122. 
188 See e.g., LESSIG, supra note 142, at 218.   
189 The Report stated the legislative purpose as follows: 
          The purpose of the bill is to ensure adequate copyright protection for American works 
in foreign nations and the continued economic benefits of a healthy surplus balance of 
trade in the exploitation of copyrighted works. The bill accomplishes these goals by 
extending the current U.S. copyright term for an additional 20 years. Such an 
extension will provide significant trade benefits by substantially harmonizing U.S. 
copyright law to that of the European Union while ensuring fair compensation for 
American creators who deserve to benefit fully from the exploitation of their works. 
Moreover, by stimulating the creation of new works and providing enhanced 
economic incentives to preserve existing works, such an extension will enhance the 
long-term volume, vitality and accessibility of the public domain. 
Senate Report 104-315, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp104:FLD010:@1(sr315). For 
the summary of testimonies, see Karjala, supra note 160, at 206-222. 
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would give rise up to monopoly control of information and thereby increase “the 
social cost of monopoly.”190  
 
On the other hand, the Court needs to further consider whether the CTEA was 
adopted in line with the procedural requirements under the public trust doctrine. 
To this end, it needs to make sure that the CTEA’s legislative process adequately 
involved stakeholders or representatives for the public and Congress further 
seriously considered their opinions. The legislative history, however, clearly 
shows that Congress actually failed to do so. This is because testimonies delivered 
before Congress were predominantly from the copyright-based industry or the 
pro-copyright camp, and the enactment of the CTEA was in fact based entirely 
upon their opinions.191  
B. Google Book Search Project  
By and large, the Google Book Search Project “create[s] a comprehensive, 
searchable, virtual card catalog of all books.”192 It helps people to find new books 
and locate the particular information they need in the relevant books. Also, it 
makes available to the public the books that are not protected by copyright yet are 
on longer in print (publishers have no economic interest to circulate them). 
Google, however, was sued for copyright violation due to the fact the project 
basically involves unauthorized verbatim copying of copyrighted works. It seems 
highly uncertain whether the project itself could constitute fair use of works. This 
is largely because it would be exceedingly hard for the court to decide whether the 
project may affect copyright holders’ marketing of similar digital library services, 
and whether Google’s online indexing of books can be counted as transformative 
use of works.193 Faced with the risk of losing in court and the severe negative 
impact of nearly endless litigation process that may affect its project, Google 
reached a private settlement with the plaintiff.194 
                                                 
190 See e.g., Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10-12, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618. 
191 See Karjala, supra note 160, at 206-222. After reviewing the CTEA’s legislative history, 
Karjala concluded that “A number of witnesses before Congress stated, in essence, that an 
extended term meant stronger copyright protection and that stronger protection would operate as 
an incentive to the creation of new works. No witnesses attempted to rebut the argument that the 
present value of the extended term to a current author is nil. No one testified that any particular 
author had decided against undertaking the creation of a new work that he would have undertaken 
had the  prospective term been life plus seventy years instead of the pre-CTEA life-plus-50-year 
term.” Id. at 221. 
192 Google Books Library Project, available at http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html. 
193 See e.g,. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can Our Culture Be Saved? The Future of Digital 
Archiving, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 989, 1018-25 (2007). For the opinion holding that the Google project 
can not pass the fair use scrutiny, see Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and the 
Future of Copyright, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 1207, 1221-25 (2007) (explaining why the Google 
project can not be seen as fair use); Elisabeth Hanratty, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, 2005 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, ¶3 (“Without a significant change in interpretation of the law, it is 
unlikely that Google will be able to successfully claim its actions constitute fair use....”);  
194 The settlement documents are available at http://books.google.com/booksrightsholders/agreeme 
nt-contents.html. 
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Generally speaking, the use of the public trust doctrine can work as a reasonable 
alternative to save the Google project which is hailed as almost an equivalent to 
invention of the printing press.195 Apart from being a check on governmental 
power, the doctrine, as I demonstrated in the preceding Part, also sets up 
restrictions on private action performed by copyright holders. To do so, it imposes 
social responsibilities on them. As mentioned above, it is very difficult for the 
court to decide whether the Google project is fair use or not. Against this 
backdrop, the court could use the public trust doctrine as a last resort to consider 
whether copyright holders have the responsibilities to accommodate public access 
to and use of their works through the Google project.  
 
On the one hand, copyright holders may have the responsibility to accommodate 
the public to exercise their collective right to cultural participation and right to 
benefit from technological advances. Through the digital technologies advanced 
by Google, the public at large is enabled to obtain “basic bibliographic 
information” about the works and the “search term” they want to locate or 
pinpoint in the works as well. These are basically the informational resources held 
in public trust and are not subject to copyright protection. Having access to and 
use of them are of essential importance for the public to enjoy their rights. For 
example, the project promotes the right to cultural participation by greatly 
facilitating researchers and teachers to locate the information they need. It also 
promotes the right to benefit from technological advances by making it easily for 
the public to locate those informational resources by digital technology. Yet 
verbatim copying done by Google is necessary to help them enjoy these rights in a 
meaningful way. Without it, the public at large cannot use this sort of digital 
technology to locate the informational resources they need. Meanwhile, the court 
should also note that Google project has taken an adequate level of restraint 
measures in order to prevent or minimize the potential harm to the copyright 
holders. For example, it only shows a few snippets to the public, displays 
copyright notice, and provides links that directs the public to the venues where 
works are available to be purchased.   
 
On the other hand, copyright holders may the responsibility to accommodate the 
public to exercise their collective right to environmental protection in our cultural 
ecosystem. Digital technology opens up a myriad of unprecedented opportunities 
to archive all of works by digitizing them. It facilitates and enhances 
environmental protection in our cultural ecosystem because it would greatly 
reduce the cost for the public to use works and enormously enriches the diversity 
                                                 
195  Mark Gregory, Google’s Books Online under Fire, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business4576827.stm/ (“The head of Oxford University's library service 
said the [Google] project could turn out to almost as important as the invention of the printing 
press.”); Google Book Search, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Book_Search (pointing out 
that “librarians hail the initiative for its potential to offer unprecedented access to what may 
become the largest online corpus of human knowledge’). 
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of works that could be made available to the public.196 From this perspective, 
copyright holders are required to get involved in the digital technology-based 
protection of our cultural ecosystem and ought to fulfill this responsibility by 
allowing digital archiving that is being carried out by the agent, such as Google.  
Yet, given that Google is a for-profit organization, the court may require it to 
donate a reasonable portion of its revenues earned from the project to the non-for-
profit public interest organizations, or to reasonably compensate copyright holders 
as a reward for their involvement in the project.  
 
CONCLUSION 
By and large, the public trust doctrine resonates strongly with Justice Holmes’ 
view that law is “the felt necessities of the time.”197  As many courts and leading 
commentators have observed, the doctrine is by nature “to be molded and 
extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to 
benefit.”198 In this Article, I have demonstrated that because there are ecological, 
economic and cultural manipulations that have arisen amid wide use of new 
technologies in the digital age, we do need to expand the use of the public trust 
doctrine from natural resources to knowledge and information flowing in our 
intangible public space. The use of the public trust doctrine, as I have shown, 
would function to counter those manipulations that have posed a severe threat to 
our cultural ecosystem, in which all of us have a stake as social members of the 
public space. Through curbing those manipulations, the doctrine would defend the 
public’s collective rights and enforce both the government’s political 
responsibilities and the copyright holder’s social responsibilities.  
 
Yet the expansion of the public trust doctrine into copyright law would give rise 
to the concern that it might afford too much power to the judiciary and thereby 
might unduly disrupt the check-and-balance structure in our democratic system. 
Indeed, this is a legitimate concern.199 But when we take a closer look at the 
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building blocks of the doctrine, it is easy to find that courts use the doctrine for 
the public interest and their exercising of the judicial review power actually stems 
from the necessity of defending the public’s collective rights.200 In the context of 
copyright law, the past decade has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of 
copyright protection spawned by the legislature. Yet the one-sided legislative 
process which has been dominated chiefly by the copyright-based industry also 
gives rise to the concern that such mode of expanding copyright protection is in 
fact socially unsound and has seriously disrupted the check-and-balance structure 
in making copyright law aimed at accommodating various social needs through 
democratic discourse and procedure-channeling. The use of the public trust 
doctrine, by and large, would function to defend the public’s collective rights and 
to correct the undemocratic problem in making copyright through empowering the 
court to act as a check on the power of the legislative branch. In this sense, the 
doctrine has the potential of restoring the check-and-balance structure in making 
copyright law as a social institution that mediates and reconciles the competing 
interests in privately owing and publicly using informational resources in the 
digital age.  
 
It is true that nothing can be perfect. Any institutional design, to a larger and 
lesser degree, carries defects. The public trust doctrine and the court’s role in 
defending the public interest are no exceptions. This is a fact that we have to 
come to terms with. Yet the court has indeed played an indispensable role in 
taking the initiative in breaking suppressive barriers to justice and freedom in dark 
time of crisis.201 A court in England invalidated the monopoly in trade granted by 
Queen Elizabeth I dating far back to late sixteenth century. 202  In the new 
millennium, it was again the Supreme Court who liberated homosexuals from the 
homophobia inherent in anti-sodomy laws,203 and resoundingly denounced the 
deprivation of Guantánamo detainees’ constitutional right to challenge their 
detention in American courts.204 These crises have the resonance with Rousseau’s 
caveat: “Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests on 
public affairs, and abuse of the laws by the Government is a lesser evil than the 
corruption of the Lawgiver….” 205  Indeed, all these crises, together with the 
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environmental crisis in our natural and cultural ecosystems, clearly reveal the high 
stakes of the potential manipulative power wielded by interest groups and 
legislatures. From this perspective, it is high time for courts to use the public trust 
doctrine as a doctrinal tool to actively respond to the unprecedented 
environmental crisis in our cultural ecosystem. 
 
 
